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MASTERY, SLAVERY, AND EMANCIPATION
Guyora Binder*
Hegel's best known text is the dialectic of master and slave in the
Phenomenology of Mind, where he portrays a master unable to com-
mand the respect of a slave because he is unwilling to grant the slave
respect.' Some historians have been at pains to point out this pas-
sage's inaccuracy as a portrait of Southern slave society. Yet Hegel's
dialectic of master and slave does not purport to be an analysis of
actual slave societies. Instead, it is a state of nature argument, aimed
at reformulating the state of nature argument of Hobbes. It is in-
tended to demonstrate that Hobbes's war of all against all is incapable
of sustaining the very individuality it takes as its premise.2 Hegel's
purpose in presenting this dialectic is not to critique slavery, but to
critique freedom, as commonly conceived in the early nineteenth cen-
tury. He aimed to show that freedom had to be conceived as some
form of association rather than independence; and that it had to be
mediated by politics rather than defended from politics.
In this essay I will suggest a communitarian interpretation of
emancipation inspired by Hegel's dialectic of master and slave. This
interpretation will proceed from an account of slave society which,
like Hegel's dialectic, equates slavery with the denial of social recogni-
tion. This account will argue that the experience of slave society led
both the masters and the slaves to conceive of freedom in social rather
than individual terms. Proceeding from this account, I suggest that
emancipation be conceived as the restoration to Afro-Americans of
the sovereignty and social esteem that Southern society valued, rather
than the repudiation of Southern values in favor of the Northern, lib-
eral ideal of independence.
I. THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETING EMANCIPATION
Americans conceive of themselves and their country as "free."
While that traditional self-conception considerably antedates emanci-
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. Research for this project
was supported by the Magavern Fellows Fund. Copyright © 1989 by Guyora Binder.
I G. Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind (J. Baillie trans. 1967) (1807) [hereinafter Phenome-
nology of Mind].
2 For a discussion of Hegel's dialectic of master and slave as a reinterpretation of Hobbes's
state of nature argument, see D. Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution,
1770-1823, at 559-64 (1975).
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pation, 3 the process of emancipation--extending freedom-required
our political and legal institutions to define that freedom with an un-
precedented precision and concreteness.' The process of legally defin-
ing freedom so that it could be extended to former slaves placed white
Americans in a harrowing trilemma: define their own freedom accu-
rately and release blacks from their position of subordination; extend
to blacks a limited conception of freedom and define their own free-
dom in limiting terms; or define their own freedom in ambitious and
generous terms and offer blacks a greater freedom than whites be-
lieved they themselves enjoyed. The choice made by the governing
institutions of American society was the second one. They perpetu-
ated a tradition of identifying freedom as individual independence.
This meant that blacks were forced to take their place in society as
vulnerable individuals; the systematic violence and deprivation to
which they were subjected was defined as the product of a series of
individual, discrete, private prejudices. The equation of freedom with
independence also meant that whites would remain vulnerable to an
increasingly intrusive and volatile market.'
3 The American Revolution inspired considerable abolitionist sentiment and arguably led
to abolition in a number of Northern states. See id. at 262-98. Nevertheless, the war was
fought to preserve what the colonists understood to be the customary liberties of Englishmen,
rather than to create new liberties. See B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution (1967); Quarles, The Revolutionary War as a Black Declaration of Independence,
in Slavery and Freedom in the Age of the American Revolution 284 (I. Berlin and R. Hoffman
eds. 1983). Moreover, if many revolutionaries saw these liberties as incompatible with the
institution of slavery, many others saw black slavery and white freedom as so consistent as to
be mutually entailed. See D. Davis, supra note 2, at 258-62; D. Davis, The Slave Power Con-
spiracy and the Paranoid Style 32-51 (1969); E. Morgan, American Slavery, American Free-
dom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (1975).
4 On the problem of defining and implementing emancipation, see E. Foner, Nothing but
Freedom: Emancipation and its Legacy (1983) [hereinafter E. Foner, Nothing but Freedom];
E. Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877, at 77-175, 228-80,
412-59 (1988) [hereinafter E. Foner, Reconstruction]; H. Hyman & W. Wiecek, Equal Justice
Under Law: Constitutional Development, 1835-75, at 232-334, 386-472 (1982); J. Tenbroek,
Equal Under Law (1965).
5 The claim that the interpretation of liberty'as independence simultaneously disadvan-
taged blacks and laboring whites has hardly received unanimous assent. See A. Bickel & B.
Schmidt, The Judiciary and Representative Government 1910-21, at 725-818 (Lochner era
formalism benefited blacks by limiting or undermining segregation); Nelson, The Impact of the
Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of the Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America,
87 Harv. L. Rev. 513 (1974) (post-Civil War era formalism represented the triumph of aboli-
tionist jurisprudence). For me, however, the limits of "liberty of contract" for liberating
blacks are revealed by another Supreme Court case decided the year after Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In United States v. Hodges, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), the Court concluded
that private interference with labor contracts was not sufficiently injurious to black laborers'
liberty to justify federal prosecution pursuant to the thirteenth amendment. Liberty as inde-
pendence restricted the legal enforcement of slavery, but it also restricted the legal enforce-
ment of freedom.
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II. A CRITIQUE OF INDEPENDENCE
Hegel's dialectic of master and slave in the Phenomenology of
Mind provides an intellectual foundation for modem communitarian
conceptions of freedom in its devastating critique of the ideal of inde-
pendence.6 How does a person come to conceive of herself as an in-
dependent individual? Hegel reasons that we must come to see
ourselves as distinct particulars by the same process that we come to
see other objects as distinct particulars. How do we distinguish ob-
jects from their surroundings? Hegel's answer is that we do so instru-
mentally-that we can only perceive objects as distinct from their
surroundings if we can imagine appropriating them to some use or
purpose. It is only our own purposive intelligence that enables us to
break apart the totality of our surroundings.7
But what enables us to differentiate ourselves from the world of
objects that we thus invent? Hegel's surprising answer is that we
must identify some other purposive intelligence, outside of ourselves,
capable of viewing us instrumentally-in other words, capable of ob-
jectifying us.8 From this it proceeds that we need others in order to
establish an independent identity. Without being able to see ourselves
through another's eyes, we would simply melt into the world of our
6 Phenomenology of Mind, supra note 1.
7 For Hegel, the identification of an object is a three-part process, beginning with the
perception of the object as other, which Hegel characterizes as a negation of it. By negating
the object as other, the knower becomes aware of herself as that which is opposed to the object.
Finally, by sublating or imagining a use for the object, the knower negates the object's other-
ness, while preserving it as an aspect of the knower's self. In sum, the knower identifies an
object by differentiating it from the self and then reincorporating it into the self as a purpose.
Phenomenology of Mind, supra note 1, at 217-27. Accordingly, objects take on their identity
as particulars from their utility for their perceivers. "What the object immediately was in itself
[an sich] ... it turns out, in truth, not to be this really; but instead this inherent nature
(Ansich) proves to be a way in which it is for an other." Id. at 218. Consequently, desire
differentiates objects from their surroundings, even as it differentiates objects from the knowing
subject. As Kojve summarizes, "Desire is what transforms Being ... into an 'object' revealed
to a 'subject' by a subject different from the object and opposed to it." A. Koj~ve, Introduction
to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of the Spirit 3-4 (1969). "Self con-
ciousness, which is absolutely for itself, and characterizes its object directly as negative, or is
primarily desire, will really ... find through experience this object's independence." Phenome-
nology of Mind, supra note 1, at 221. That the knowing subject cannot accomplish-or even
identify-her projects without differentiating objects implies the independence of those objects;
but their dependence on a purposive knower for their identities in turn unifies discrete objects
into a world of life experience. Id. at 222-24.
8 "A self-consciousness has before it a self-consciousness. Only so and only then is it self-
consciousness in actual fact; for here first of all it comes to have the unity of itself in its
otherness." Phenomenolgy of Mind, supra note 1, at 226-27. By being other-that is, an
object-for a self-conscious subject, a second self-conscious subject acquires a distinct identity.
This identity is not just the sum total of its life experience, but it is one life experience in a
world that can be experienced differently because it can be experienced by others.
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own perceptions. Accordingly, concludes Hegel, we are dependent
upon one another for recognition.9
Hegel uses a hypothetical master and slave relationship to illus-
trate a further claim: we cannot achieve recognition outside of a polit-
ical community characterized by mutual obligation. Beginning with
two utterly egoistic individuals, each bent on receiving recognition
while conferring none, Hegel envisions a struggle to death for recogni-
tion.10 Because neither can experience recognition by killing the other
or by being killed,11 Hegel reasons, one will eventually submit to the
other, initiating a master-slave relationship.12
By means of this relationship, the master hopes to achieve inde-
pendence by obtaining recognition without assuming any social obli-
gations to another. The slave, traditionally characterized as
dependent, retains with life the future hope of achieving recognition.
In the meantime, however, the slave must gratify the master's every
whim, offering unrequited recognition. But now, proceeds Hegel, the
master encounters a difficulty: because the slave exists for her only to
serve her own purpose, she cannot recognize the slave as an independ-
ent purposive intelligence.13 While the master may demand recogni-
tion from the slave, the master cannot receive it because she has
deprived the slave of the capacity to objectify her. The slave, permit-
ted to express only the master's subjectivity, cannot provide the
9 Id. at 229.
10 Id. at 231-32. The reason these two are driven to fight for recognition rather than earn-
ing it through cooperation, is the distorted conception of individual identity for which they
desire to be recognized. Each wants to be recognized as independent of everyone and every-
thing. Accordingly, they want to show that they are independent of the other, by demonstrat-
ing the other's mortality. They also want to show their independence of the world by denying
their own fear of death. Accordingly, "each aims at the destruction and death of the other,"
and each "risks its own life." Id. at 232.
11 Through death, doubtless, there has arisen the certainty that both did stake their
life, and held it lightly both in their own case and in the case of the other; but that
is not for those who underwent this struggle. They cancel their consciousness
which had its place in this alien element of natural existence.
Id. at 233.
When Hegel concludes that "[i]n this experience self-consciousness becomes aware that
life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness," id. at 234, it must be understood that for
Hegel the italicized term signifies much more than biological functioning. Life is the media-
tion of consciousness through experience: the entire lived world of involvement with others,
dependence, maturation, and learning. See id. at 223-24.
12 Id. at 234.
13 "[W]hat is done by the bondsman is properly an action on the part of the master." Id. at
236. By this, Hegel does not mean merely that the master is legally responsible for the slave's
acts, but that the master is psychologically constrained by her role as master to recognize only
herself and not the slave's actions. Koj~ve explains: "[Since the Slave works only for the
Master, only to satisfy the Master's desire and not his own, it is the master's desire that acts in
and through the Slave.]" A. Kojve, supra note 7, at 18-19.
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master with an Archimedean point from which to see herself. 14 Thus
unable to objectify the master, the slave is paradoxically constrained
from offering the master recognition. Deprived of an identity, the
slave cannot confer one on the master-withholding esteem from the
slave, the master cannot credit the esteem she compels the slave to
confer. For the master, the price of eschewing meaningful society is a
loss of individual identity.
In this process the master, having given over all purposive activ-
ity to the slave, loses not only her self, but her world as well. The
slave, on the other hand, is engaged with the world through her work
and has all the requisites for developing an individual identity. 5 She
learns her own capacities through work and learns to see herself
through another's eyes, even if only as an object, a product.1 6 Only
the master's lack of a discerning purposive intelligence impoverishes
the slave's sense of identity.' 7 Yet it is the slave, deprived of formal
recognition, who achieves an identity.'" The master, unwilling to rec-
ognize that identity, can receive neither recognition nor identity in
return.' 9 Because it is the slave's agency and identity that permits the
master to act purposively in the world, it is the master who is depen-
dent on the slave rather than vice versa. 20 The master's attempt to
render herself utterly independent of the world by mediating her rela-
14 The master "is thus not assured of self-existence as his truth." Phenomenology of Mind,
supra note 1, at 237. In a celebrated passage, Kojive concluded that "he is recognized by
someone whom he does not recognize... without value for him. For he can be satisfied only
by recognition from one whom he recognizes as worthy of recognizing him. The Master's
attitude, therefore, is an existential impasse." A. Kojve, supra note 7, at 19.
Is These requisites include the fear of death that has supposedly induced the slave to con-
sent to slavery. For Hegel, fear of death is an aspect of recognizing one's contingency-the
fact that the world can go on without one. It is in part this detachability from our world that
gives each of us a distinct identity. Thus for Hegel it is really death that is "the sovereign
master." Phenomenology of Mind, supra note 1, at 237.
16 By viewing herself as an object, like the resources upon which she labors, the slave can
imagine cultivating, developing, and transforming herself through labor. See id. at 238; A.
Koj~ve, supra note 7, at 24-25.
17 The master's ability to objectify, to use the slave, is limited by the poverty of the master's
desire. Indeed, as Patterson points out, in criticizing Hegel's model, "most slaves in most
precapitalist societies were not enslaved in order to be made over into workers; they may even
have been economic burdens on their masters," maintained as idle status symbols. 0. Patter-
son, Slavery and Social Death 99 (1982). Yet Koj~ve's interpretation of Hegdl's model ac-
counts for this, in treating all of the master's commands as aimed at confirming mastery rather
than accomplishing some change in the world. "[The Master is fixed in his Mastery. He
cannot go beyond himself, change, progress.... He can be killed; he cannot be transformed,
educated. He has risked his life to be Master. Therefore, Mastery is the supreme given value
for him, beyond which he cannot go.]" A. Koj~ve, supra note 7, at 22.
18 Phenomenology of Mind, supra note 1, at 237.
19 Id. at 236.
20 "It is not an independent, but rather a dependent consciousness that he has achieved."
Id. at 236-37.
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tions with it through another completely dependent upon herself has
failed.21 She has lost the ability to distinguish herself from the world
and has become completely dependent upon another human being.
Because independence is impossible, individuality can only be
achieved in a community characterized by mutual recognition. Thus,
our very identities commit us to recognize others and obligate us to
create or perpetuate communities characterized by such mutual
recognition.
Now I want to stress that the obligation this entails cannot be
met within liberal society in so far as we conceive of liberal society as
a set of discrete individuals permitted by a stable legal framework to
pursue instrumental activity.22 It is not an obligation that can be dis-
charged by each citizen independently, by conformity to rules speci-
fied in advance. Instead, it is an unbounded and unpredictable
obligation to others of the sort entailed by a friendship, an obligation
that cannot be fulfilled without the help of society. In such a society,
others are obligated to recognize us; and we are obligated to help
them by showing our concern for their esteem. The recognition re-
quired by Hegel's argument in the dialectic of master and slave is
more than the tolerance of other's ends that, for example, Bruce Ack-
erman defines as the foundation of liberal political discourse.23
In his introduction to the section on lordship and bondage, Hegel
demonstrates that an instrumental conception of personal identity is
inadequate given the nature of human desire. Self-conscious persons
can not be defined in terms of their ends. Instead, concludes Hegel,
"self-consciousness [is] infinite" 24 because "[w]hen a self-conscious-
ness is the object [of desire], the object is just as much ego as ob-
ject.' ' 25 In other words, we cannot identify ourselves over time by our
ends because what we desire is the experience of relationships that
will change us in ways we cannot predict. We desire to change the
object of our desire into someone we cannot continue to desire with-
out ourselves changing. The desire for recognition fundamental to
individual identity requires us to affect and be affected by the desires
of others. Hence, it is inconsistent with the mutual tolerance of and
21 Id. at 235-36 (master attempts to gratify desires without encountering the independence
of the object discovered in the process of working).
22 Cf. Westphal, Hegel on Slavery, Independence, and Liberalism, 10 Cardozo L. Rev.
1566 (1989) (liberal society characterized by mutual obligation; Hegel's Phenomenology not
generally thought of as critique of liberalism).
23 See Ackerman, Why Dialogue? (unpublished draft available at Cardozo Law Review).
24 Phenomenology of Mind, supra note 1, at 229.
25 Id. at 227.
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indifference toward the preferences of others that circumscribes the
civic obligations of the citizen of any liberal society.
III. ON THE PERILS OF APPLYING HEGEL
As an account of the origins of slavery as actually practiced in
the Western hemisphere in the nineteenth century, Hegel's story
would be not only inaccurate but pernicious. It is inaccurate to the
extent that it suggests that such slavery was the consequence of con-
flict between equally powerful individuals in a state of nature. In-
stead, it always involved massive, sustained politicide by one culture
against another, driven by the imperatives of a market economy.26
Hegel's scenario is pernicious to the extent that it repeats the myth of
"the cowardly contract." The cowardly contract is a captive's agree-
ment, at sword point, to perpetual service in return for prolonged life.
This myth of the origins of slavery, prevalent in Western culture, par-
tially explains the Southern slaveholders' characterization of the slave
as a person without honor. According to Orlando Patterson,
The idea that a person's honor is more valuable than his life, and
that to prefer life to honor betrays a degraded mind, comes close to
being a genuinely universal belief. It is a theme that haunts West-
ern literature ....
... [I]t was the choice of life over honor that the slave or his
ancestor made, or had made for him. The dishonor of slavery...
came in the primal act of submission.27
A conflation of two of the origins of slavery recognized in Ro-
man law-capture and contract-the cowardly contract was an obli-
gatory topic for any natural law theorist from the sixteenth through
the nineteenth centuries.2' Beginning as justifications of slavery,29
these discussions evolved into condemnations of slavery based on the
26 See generally B. Davidson, The African Slave Trade (1980) (describing causes and ef-
fects of slave trade); E. Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (1944) (describing causes and effects
of slave trade).
27 0. Patterson, supra note 17, at 78.
28 Roman law provides three lawful origins for slavery: capture during warfare, self-sale,
and heredity. T. Wiedemann, Greek and Roman Slavery 23 (1981) (citing Marcianus, Dig.
1.5; M. Inst. 1.5). While there is no indication that captives had discretion to choose death
rather than serve, Orlando Patterson argues that Roman captors frequently chose to kill cap-
tives. 0. Patterson, supra note 17, at 107. The legal foundation for slavery was of interest to
natural law theorists because in Roman law, slavery represented a rare instance of a practice
condemned by natural law but permitted by the law of nations. See D. Davis, The Problem of
Slavery in Western Culture 83 (1966).
29 See 2 H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres 103-04, 107-08 (F. Kelsey trans.
1925) (1625) (justifying slavery as condition entered voluntarily or imposed upon children to
prevent starvation); T. Hobbes, Leviathan 132-33 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1962) (1651) (despotic
dominion over captive justified by captive's consent in return for being spared); 2 S. Pufendorf,
1441
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unconscionability of its underlying "contract. '3  Yet even such aboli-
tionist renditions of the myth tended to blame slavery on the slave,
substituting a paternalistic defense of emancipation for the paternalis-
tic defense of slavery offered before. According to this critique, slav-
ery is illegitimate not because it was imposed on slaves against their
will, but because their consent to it was coerced. Slaves had to be
emancipated because they did not know their own best interests, just
as others had argued that slaves had to be mastered because they were
incompetent custodians of their own interests.
Both viewpoints are premised on a contempt for the slave as dis-
honorable, as a collaborator in her own victimization. Such an out-
look entered modern American historiography with the carefully
documented argument of Ulrich Bonnell Phillips that slaves were
contented.3 1  Less malevolent tributaries to this tradition include
those who, like Stanley Elkins and Senator Moynihan, present the
slave as morally disabled by slavery rather than enslaved because of
her disability.32 Elkins's portrait of American slaves as "infantilized
Sambos ' 3 is etched against his contrasting admiration for the "he-
roic" warriors 34 of Africa and "impressive" slave rebels of Brazil.35
Moreover, he argues, the recorded experience of concentration camp
victims demonstrates that infantilization "proved possible for people
in a full state of complex civilization, for men and women who were
not black and not savages."3a6 Despite his earnest efforts to strip the
racist implications from his thesis that Afro-Americans accepted slav-
ery, Elkins cannot forbear from referring to American slaves as "plan-
tation Negro[es]""a whose aspirations were limited to the enjoyment
Elementorum Jurisprudentiae Universalis Libri Duo 15 (W. Oldfather trans. 1931) (1660)
(lawful to enslave those liable for execution, in return for sparing their lives).
30 J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government 88 (J. Gough 3d ed. 1966) (1690)
(lawful captor may kill or enslave captive, but captive cannot contractually consent to slavery);
C. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 236 (T. Nugen trans. 1949) (1748) (captors may not
lawfully kill captives and so may not enslave them; nor can slavery be created by contract
because liberty is inalienable); J. Rousseau, The Social Contract 57-58 (M. Cranston trans.
1968) (1762) (liberty inalienable; captor has no right to kill; even if he did, spared captive
would have no obligation to obey); W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England
411-12 (1765) (repeating Montesquieu's arguments).
31 U. Phillips, American Negro Slavery: A Survey of the Supply, Employment and Control
of Negro Labor as Determined by the Plantation Regime (1918).
32 S. Elkins, Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional and Intellectual Life (1959);
The Negro Family: The Case for National Action (Office of Policy Planning and Research,
U.S. Dep't of Labor Mar. 1965) (Daniel Moynihan, contributor).
33 S. Elkins, supra note 32, at 84-88.
34 Id. at 97-98.
35 Id. at 137 & n.2.
36 Id. at 89.
37 Id. at 129.
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of "catfish and watermelons."3 Indictments of slavery that insist its
worst crime was the dehumanizing of the slaves still imply that slaves
were something less than human.39
There's no question that Hegel's dialectic of master and slave
could be read as simply another example of this depressing theme in
Western culture. Passages like "the master gets his recognition from
an other consciousness, for ... the latter affirms itself as unessen-
tial"'4 can be read to imply the slave's acquiescence in slavery.41 Con-
38 Id. at 136. Many of the assumptions upon which Elkins's argument rested have been
challenged: (1) His failure to adduce primary evidence in support of the "Sambo" characteriza-
tion has been pointed out. See F. Boney, Southerners All 149 (1984). (2) The accuracy of
white perceptions of black dependence and contentment has been challenged. Compare S.
Elkins, supra note 32, at 131 (illustrating this assumption) with E. Genovese, Roll, Jordan,
Roll: The World the Slaves Made 97-113 (1974) and H. Gutman, The Black Family in Slavery
and Freedom, 1750-1925, at 320-24 (1986) (challenging this assumption by noting the mass
shock of former slaveholders at the time of the emancipation when scores of ex-slaves chose to
leave the plantations rather than continue in the service of their masters) and V. Harding,
There is a River: The Black Struggle for Freedom in America 97-112 (1983) (challenging this
assumption by pointing to the upsurge of black activists such as Nat Turner and Frederick
Douglass). (3) The assumption that the relative lack of armed resistance to slavery implied
acceptance has been challenged. Compare S. Elkins, supra note 32, at 133-39 (illustrating this
assumption) with E. Genovese, supra (challenging this assumption). (4) The assumption that
black parents and black fathers in particular had no familial authority (on which D. Moyni-
han, supra note 32, at 16, relied) has been challenged. Compare S. Elkins, supra note 32, at
130-31 (illustrating this assumption) with E. Genovese, supra, at 450-58, 482-501 (challenging
this assumption) and H. Gutman, supra, at 303-08, 461-69 (challenging this assumption). (5)
Finally, the assumption that American blacks retained nothing of their African cultural heri-
tage has been challenged. Compare S. Elkins, supra note 32, at 103 (illustrating this assump-
tion) with L. Levine, Black Culture and Black Consciousness (1977) (challenging this
assumption).
39 The absoluteness with which such a personality ("real" or "unreal") had been
stamped upon the plantation slave does much to make plausible the ante-bellum
Southerner's difficulty in imagining that blacks anywhere could be anything but a
degraded race-and it goes far to explain his failure to see any sense at all in
abolitionism.
S. Elkins, supra note 32, at 85.
40 Phenomenology of Mind, supra note 1, at 236.
41 Nor is this an isolated passage. Hegel's argument that self-consciousness requires inter-
action with human beings turns on the idea that all other objects of desire are invincibly in-
dependent. Because they must work for the gratification of desire, people are constantly made
aware of their dependence on a world outside themselves. Only through other human beings
can our desires be gratified without our efforts. Thus we can achieve independence of the
material only through the voluntary offices of another: "On account of the independence of the
object ... [self-consciousness] can only attain satisfaction when this object itself effectually
brings about negation within itself." Id. at 225-26.
Yet Hegel is at pains to point out that the master simply substitutes one form of depen-
dence for another, while the slave finds a measure of independence in her mastery over the
material world. The master's fantasy of a one-sided transaction is unachievable. Thus, for
Hegel, the slave's agency in her own oppression is simply a hypothetical moment in a dialecti-
cal argument-not a description of an actual or even possible scenario. If the master were to
blithely rely on the uncoerced will of the slave, she would soon find herself mastered. The only
ways to maintain control over the slave are (1) coercion, which involves labor, the one thing
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sider the following passage from John Gabriel Woerner's civil war
novel, The Rebel's Daughter.4 2 Woerner, a judge, journalist, philoso-
pher, and legal scholar, was a member of a circle of mainly German-
American Hegelians, centered in St. Louis in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. Henry Brokmeyer, one of the leaders of this movement, is rep-
resented in Woerner's novel by the character of Professor Rauhenfels,
who exclaims:
"[U]nder the present condition of things it is of far greater impor-
tance to humanity-to the cause of freedom-that our government
remain intact, than that the normal condition of the slaves be
changed. As Doctor Taylor [a cipher for Denton Snider, another
leading American Hegelian] once neatly expressed it-
'Tis not the outward bond that makes the slave-but the base cra-
ven thought within the man.'
Slaves are such upon their own compliance. No freeman, loving
liberty above life or ease, was ever yet made a slave. To the slave,
then, manumission is of no benefit. The vice of slavery consists in
its degradation of the master, because slavery is incompatible with
his own freedom."43
This is an example of the potentially racist implications of read-
ing Hegel's dialectic of master and slave as an account of actual slave
societies. Accordingly, historians of slavery such as Eugene Genovese
and Orlando Patterson have attacked such readings as inaccurate por-
trayals of slave society."
Genovese has invoked Hegel in insisting upon the agency of
slaves in perpetually resisting slavery. Nevertheless, Genovese's dis-
tinction between acquiescence and resistance sometimes seems re-
markably elusive. Thus, he attributes to Hegel the view that "[i]f one
man could [become an extension of another's will], he could do it only
by an act of that very will supposedly being surrendered, and he
would remain so only while he himself chose to."4 This sentence
looks very similar to the sentiment, attributed to the character of Dr.
Taylor in The Rebel's Daughter, that slaves deserved slavery for not
that, according to Hegel, the master wishes to avoid or (2) offering the slave recognition, which
would mean that the slave would cease to be a slave. Orlando Patterson argues that in most
slave societies, this is exactly what masters did: "By holding out the promise of redemption,
the master provides himself with a motivating force more powerful than any whip." 0. Patter-
son, supra note 17, at 101. Any slave who responded to this offer by cooperating with the
master could hardly be said to be acting out of self-contempt. To the contrary, such slaves
acted out of "a passionate zeal for dignity and freedom." Id.
42 J. Woerner, The Rebel's Daughter: A Story of Love, Politics and War (1899).
43 Id. at 427-28.
44 See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
43 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 88.
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emancipating themselves.46 Yet Genovese seems to be offering it in
support of the subtle argument that in merely exercising the will to
choose whether and when to accommodate themselves to slavery,
slaves resisted it. "Thus, the slaves, by accepting a paternalistic ethos
and legitimizing class rule, developed their most powerful defense
against the dehumanization implicit in slavery."' 47 If Genovese is not
entirely convincing in reconciling Hegel's analysis of slavery with the
phenomenon of slave resistance, he has revealed his debt to Hegel in
counting among such resistance the slaves' efforts to endow one an-
other with social identities through the constant reconstruction of cul-
ture and community.48
While Genovese has challenged the assumption that slaves acqui-
esced in slavery, Patterson has challenged the platitude that slavery
hurt the masters more than the slaves by stressing the ability of
Southern whites to confer recognition on one another. 49 Accordingly,
concludes Patterson, "I disagree totally with the view that slavery cre-
ated an existential impasse for the master."50 Yet he too shows his
debt to Hegel by counting dishonor-the denial of recognition-as
the essential feature of slavery and seeing in this feature a fatal
instability.
The slave's struggle made it necessary that the master, in order to
make slavery workable, provide an opportunity for the negation of
slavery. The conflict between master and slave became trans-
formed from a personal into an institutional dialectic, in which
slavery, as an enduring social process, stood opposite to and re-
quired manumission as an essential precondition."1
IV. THE INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS OF INDEPENDENCE
If Professor Rauhenfels's sanctimonious pronouncements are in-
accurate as readings of Southern slave society, that is in part because
they're inaccurate readings of Hegel. In condescending to the slaves,
Rauhenfels reveals a faith, more liberal then Hegelian, in the capacity
of isolated individuals to emancipate themselves. This faith is further
exemplified by Rouhenfels's naive assumption that masters may re-
cover their independence simply by casting off their human property.
Yet, as Hegel understood, people became dependent upon the ex-
ploitation of others in pursuit of independence, not in flight from it.
46 J. Woerner, supra note 42, at 427.
47 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 7.
48 Id. at 598 (generally); id. at 284 (religion); id. at 432 (language); id. at 452 (family).
49 0. Patterson, supra note 17, at 97-101.
50 Id. at 99.
51 Id. at 101.
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C.B. Macpherson has argued that the political and economic indepen-
dence valorized in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political
thought could only be maintained in a market society through the
constant accumulation of capital and the exploitation of others.52
According to Macpherson, the ideal of independence entered
British political discourse in the turbulent century of Hobbes and
Locke because of changes in British economic life.53 The proliferation
of markets temporarily generated a substantial class of yeoman farm-
ers and self-employed artisans. Because relations of employment were
understood to entail political subjection, the emergence of a substan-
tial class of self-employed farmers and artisans provided a political as
well as an economic referent for the concept of independence. This
class was particularly vigilant in defending its meagre capital because
that capital was all that stood between its members and the political
status of servitude that attended employment. 54 Moreover, argues
Macpherson, they had good reason to be frightened of losing this
political and economic independence.
Macpherson contends that even in an entire society composed of
independent producers, some will eventually be forced into employ-
ment, as long as a market exists in land or capital.55 Especially dili-
gent or lucky producers, producing more, will be able to cut prices.
This will drive down the income of the least efficient producers below
subsistence levels, requiring them to sell either their capital or their
labor. Selling their capital will only reduce their productive capacity
and further increase their need to sell labor to those acquiring surplus
capital. As these capital-rich producers increase their yield, they are
able to further cut prices, thus forcing more capital and more labor
onto the market. Unless land is abundant and labor can be im-
ported-as was the case in colonial Virginia-land will eventually be
in the hands of a few, and most independent producers will enter the
labor market (as is now the case). In such a setting, any producer
failing to accumulate capital would lose it.56 Accordingly, the main-
tenance of political and economic independence in a market society
depends upon the exploitation of others.
Realizing this, the Virginia planters embraced slavery as a way to
preserve a political community of apparently "independent" produ-
52 C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke
(1962).
53 See id. at 153-54.
54 Id.
55 See id. at 51-55.
56 Id.
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cers. 7 The seventeenth century was a time of bitter social conflict in
Virginia, as the efforts of large landowners to maintain control of a
largely indentured labor force "placed the colony continually on the
brink of rebellion.""8 By the end of the century, however, "[t]he sub-
stitution of slaves for servants ... ended the threat . . . ."9 As white
immigration to Virginia tapered off, the fortunes of laboring whites
improved. Released from servitude after shorter terms, they were
granted land and could aspire to be masters themselves.6' Small
farmers improved their economic position during this period as well.6"
As white laborers acquired property and the political franchise, they
found that many of their political and economic interests now coin-
cided with those of their former employers.62 But what bound them
together even more thoroughly was their assimilation of the republi-
can ideology that would later drive the revolution.63
In the eyes of Virginia's republicans, the problem posed by an
unregulated market society of the sort modeled by Macpherson, was
not that it required the exploitation of some, but that it threatened the
independence of all. While republicanism required "a wide distribu-
tion of property to create an enlarged enfranchised yeomanry who
would see to it that government stuck to its proper business of pro-
tecting liberty and property,"'" it by no means required that property
ownership and its attendant independence be universal. To be sure,
paupers could pose a threat to a republican polity: "an ambitious ad-
venturer could buy them with bread, and arm them to attack the lib-
erty of the rest."6 But it was precisely this threat to which slavery
responded, not by making the poor "wards of the state, which would
have aggravated the danger, but [by] spread[ing] them among the in-
dependent landholders, whose strength they would thereby increase
instead of diminish."' 66 Hence the role of slavery in republican
thought was paradoxical; "it was the primary evil that men sought to
avoid for society as a whole by curbing monarchs and establishing
57 See E. Morgan, supra note 3.
58 Id. at 295.
59 Id. at 308.
60 Id. at 331, 344.
61 Id. at 343.
62 Id. at 365-66.
63 Id. at 369, 372-79. On the role of republicanism in the revolution, see B. Bailyn, supra
note 3; G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (1969); J. Pocock, The
Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition
(1975).
64 E. Morgan, supra note 3, at 370.




republics. But it was also the solution to one of society's most serious
problems, the problem of the poor."67
Wealthy Virginians supported, even subsidized, the spread of
mastery in order to maintain its political legitimacy-and the political
ideal they employed to legitimate it was that of independence. Wit-
nessing the industrialization of British and Northern society in the
decade before the Civil War, The Richmond Enquirer could insist
with increasing confidence that " '[in] this country alone does perfect
equality of civil and social privilege exist among the white population,
and it exists solely because we have black slaves.' "68 Accepting the
founders' interpretation of freedom as independence, Virginia's lead-
ing newspaper was bound to conclude with them that "'[flreedom is
not possible without slavery.' "69
If some Southerners proved no less invested in independence
than their Northern critics, Northern ideals were no less dependent
on mastery than Southern ones were. Like their Southern opponents,
many Northern abolitionists held republican commitments. Accord-
ingly, they shared the Virginians' idealization of the independent pro-
ducer and with it, their contempt for the laboring poor: "[F]or all
their glorification of labor," concludes Eric Foner, Lincoln's support-
ers "looked down upon those who labored for wages all their lives."7
If they classified wage laborers as "free," it was only because of the
faulty assumption that the abundance of land seized from native
American tribes would enable laborers to become independent.7'
"'Our paupers today,'" the New York Times assured its readers,
" 'thanks to free labor, are our yeomen and merchants of to-
morrow.' "72 Nor could laborers be fully redeemed from their de-
spised state of dependence even by self-employment. In a dynamic
market society, no one could be assured of independence until he em-
ployed others. As one Republican senator saw it, "'[a] young man
goes out to service . . . for compensation until he acquires money
enough to buy a farm... and soon he becomes himself the employer
of labor.' '73 ,, 'The man who labored for another last year,'" in-
67 Id. at 381.
68 J. Oakes, The Ruling Race: A History of American Slaveholders 141 (1982) (quoting the
Richmond Enquirer).
69 Id.
70 E. Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party
Before the Civil War 23 (1970).
71 Id. at 32 (contrary to the beliefs of Republicans, opportunities for economic indepen-
dence were shrinking in the 1850s and few laborers became yeoman farmers as a result of
westward expansion).
72 Id. at 16 (quoting N.Y. Times).
73 Id. at 17 (quoting Senator Zachariah Chandler).
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sisted Lincoln, "'this year labors for himself, and next year he will
hire others to labor for him.' """ Republicans were able to reconcile
their new characterization of the wage laborer as free with their tradi-
tional identification of employment as servitude only through faith in
a millenarian future. The laborer could be characterized as free only
if reimagined not only as his own master, but as the master of others.
The instability of economic independence, even in the republican im-
agination, reveals that the ideal of independence was dependent on
fantasies of mastery. Eventually, these fantasies will be replaced by a
cynical social Darwinist rhetoric of equal opportunity which will
redefine servitude as the failure of an exacting test.75 Thus, republican
images of wage labor began by condemning exploitation, proceeded to
deny it, and ended by justifying it.
In the end, the Republican party of Lincoln opposed slavery for
the same reason that the Republican party of Jefferson supported it:
each was committed to a contradictory conception of freedom as in-
dependence in a market society where no one could remain free with-
out enlisting, coercing or hiring help.
V. BEYOND INDEPENDENCE: THE SLAVES' FREEDOM
Southerners, black and white, offended Northern individualism
by having the temerity to admit that freedom required power. Mas-
ters and slaves shared this conception of freedom, but not because the
masters imposed their culture on the slaves. Orlando Patterson tells
us that the sub-Saharan African societies from which slaves were
drawn were, like most slave societies, timocratic. 76 To be a slave in
such a society-generally a captive in warfare77 or descended from a
captive-was to be without honor. 78 These societies associated honor
with conformity to exacting codes of courtesy. 79 They also placed
great emphasis on membership, kinship, and ancestry.80 Living kin
74 Id. at 30 (quoting Abraham Lincoln).
75 See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 38 (1915) (complacent recognition that market
competition leads to inequalities of bargaining power and coercion).
76 0. Patterson, supra note 17, at 96 (all slave societies timocratic); id. at 82-83 (sub-
Saharan Africa); id. at 97 (northern Nigeria). Patterson takes the term timocracy from 8
Plato, Republic *548-49 (culture in which love of honor and glory is the guiding principle).
See 0. Patterson, supra note 17, at 81 n.14.
77 0. Patterson, supra note 17, at 39-40 (Ashanti).
78 Id. at 83-84 (Fulani).
79 M. Herskovits, The Myth of the Negro Past 141-42 (1962).
80 O. Patterson, supra note 17, at 83 (number of dependents crucial for prestige in African
societies). African persistence in organizing social life around tribal lineage even after evolving
centralized states is in striking contrast to the European feudal experience and can be attrib-
uted to avoiding the socially disruptive effects of institutionalized slavery on the Roman-or
American-model. See B. Davidson, The African Slave Trade 46 (1980).
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were viewed as a source of prestige and social protection, and de-
parted ancestors as a source of magical protection.8  To be free meant
to have many protectors, alive and dead; to be a slave, cut off from
one's kinship, ancestry, and village meant to have only one.82
Instead of defining slaves and nonslaves in polarized terms, people
in societies where the personalistic idiom was dominant perceived
the status of persons along a single dimension of power: that of
claims and powers in other persons. All persons were seen as the
objects of property. Individuals differed in the degree of power,
claims, and privileges others had in them and in the counterbalanc-
ing set of claims, powers, and privileges they had in others.
In human terms this was seen as the amount of protection a
person had and the number of his protectors.83
Basil Davidson confirms that in the kingdom of Ruanda, "no-
body was 'free' in the modem sense of the word, for even the [elite]
Tutsi were wedded to their laborers by a formal code of interwoven
duties. Moreover, it was better for a Tutsi to become the vassal of a
stronger man than to remain 'on his own.'-84 In such a society, to
have no protectors, alive or dead, was to be socially nonexistent. To
be independent was to be worse off than a slave, because spiritually
and socially vulnerable: "'If you have not a master,' goes a popular
[Ashanti] proverb, 'a beast will catch you.' "85 All Ashanti entered
into voluntary relations of dependence: "'it was the masterless man
and woman who ran the imminent danger of having what we should
term "their freedom" turned into involuntary bondage of a more
drastic nature.' "86 With no place in society, one might as well com-
mit suicide8 7 as many captive Africans did en route to America.
8
Accordingly, slaves in African societies rarely ran away, having "no
place to go" since they had often lost honor in their own communities
and, with it, the protection of their ancestors.89
81 0. Patterson, supra note 17, at 53.
82 Id. at 28.
83 Id. at 27 (discussing nonwestern societies but especially African); see also id. at 5, 9-10
(slave societies generally); id. at 53 (African).
84 B. Davidson, supra note 80, at 35.
85 0. Patterson, supra note 17, at 27.
86 Id. (quoting R. Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution 33 (1929)).
87 Id. at 81 (desire "to be dead" of Tupinamban slave (South America)).
88 See V. Harding, supra note 38, at 18-20, 22, 32, 60; H. Gutman, supra note 38.
89 O. Patterson, supra note 17, at 53 (Tiv of central Nigeria). Patterson explains the ac-
ceptance by slaves of the authority of the master in traditional societies on the basis of the
slave's social isolation-only by accepting her role can the slave receive even the limited social
recognition Patterson attributes to such "liminal incorporation" into society. "Without the
master, as the Tuareg insist, the slave does not exist. The slave came to obey him not only out
of fear, but out of the basic need to exist as a quasi-person, however marginal and vicarious
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To Africans, slavery meant the deprivation of membership in
networks of dependence and the eradication of their histories.' Free-
dom, by contrast, meant dependence upon and identification with a
tribal collectivity enduring in time. Identification with a community
gave one social power and the communal recognition of that power
took the form of social esteem or honor.91
[T]he real antithesis to slavery in societies where the personalistic
idiom of power was dominant was what may be called counter-
vailing power. People did not seek to be "free" (in the modem
Western "bourgeois" sense of isolation from the influence of
others) in such systems because, ironically, this was the surest path
to slavery.92
Eschewing independence, Africans sought to protect and enhance
their own social power by accepting the protection of others. While
the resulting relations of protection certainly involved hierarchy, au-
thority, and deference, few African societies were characterized by
rigid class or caste stratification 9a and some-especially before the
pervasive penetration of the European slave trade-practiced repre-
sentative government. 94
Strictly speaking, then, there was no concept of "freedom" in the
non-Western societies from which the west's slaves were drawn.95
Nevertheless, it was the struggle of these non-Western slaves against
institutionalized slavery that gave birth to the west's master value-
freedom. "The first men and women to struggle for freedom, the first
to think of themselves as free in the only meaningful sense of the term,
were freedmen. And without slavery there would have been no freed-
men." 96 The concept of freedom cannot be given meaning in isolation
from the institution of slavery as practiced in the West. But that does
not. mean that freedom must be interpreted as a wholly Western
value, for it has little meaning apart from the struggle against slavery
that existence might be." Id. at 46. In fairness to the oft-criticized Stanley Elkins, the parallel
should be pointed out between this explanation of domination and Elkins's account of what he
sees as the acceptance of white authority by American slaves. S. Elkins, supra note 32, at 119-
37.
90 0. Patterson, supra note 17, at 53 (Imbangala of northwestern Angola).
91 Id. at 10-11 (honor connected with social power). But see id. at 331-32 (social power
associated with honor turns on membership in community, not political authority as such).
92 Id. at 28.
93 B. Davidson, supra note 80, at 47 (fluid class structure); id. at 38 (descendants of slaves
could become chiefs in a few generations); 0. Patterson, supra note 17, at 82-83 (absent or
vague stratification in most traditional African societies).
94 B. Davidson, supra note 80, at 36 (states without kings); id. at 106 (tribes without chiefs
or with "broadly representative" chiefship).
95 0. Patterson, supra note 17, at 27.
96 Id. at 342; see also id. at 101 (struggle against slavery engenders concept of freedom).
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of the non-Western people it was imposed upon. We cannot under-
stand what those reluctant Afro-Americans were struggling for unless
we recall the political values of the African societies American slavery
destroyed. And those values exalted community, ancestry, and place.
Thus forced immigration, plantation agriculture, and market so-
ciety represented a much more devastating deprivation for Africans
than slavery alone. It represented displacement for people whose
identities were grounded in a sense of place. It represented the eradi-
cation of family and village for people whose identities were invested
in membership. 97 At the same time, the patterns of Southern agricul-
tural labor made it difficult to resurrect village life. Slaves were either
isolated on small farms unable to support a viable community,98 or
subjected to work regimens on large plantations that severely limited
their opportunities to collectively order their lives.99
Accordingly, slave resistance was initially focused on escaping
white society altogether, by returning slave ships to Africa, 00 by es-
tablishing maroon communities in the American swamps, or, less
often, by joining native American communities. 0 1 Frequently, these
collective escapes involved attempts to maintain tribal ties or at least
97 Newly arrived Africans valued and attempted to reconstitute traditional kinship systems
in this country. See H. Gutman, supra note 38, at 329-31. Of course their new families proved
no more secure in the face of slavery than their old ones. Gutman describes the torment of
slaves, ripped by sale from families they would remember all their lives. Id. at 6-7 (letter of
remarried husband and father to beloved wife away from whom he was sold); id. at 35-36
(letter of wife to sold husband about the imminent sale of their children); id. at 319 (slaves
could never accommodate themselves to breakup of family). Frederick Douglass discusses the
slaves' great attachment to place and kin and their constant fear of loss:
The people of the North, and free people generally.... have less attachment to the
places where they are born and brought up than had the slaves .... [After sale and
removal] [h]is going out into the fields was like a living man going to a tomb, who,
with open eyes, sees himself buried out of sight and hearing of wife, children, and
friends of kindred tie.
Id. at 357-58. Accordingly, slaves constantly pressured masters to let families work together
and to sell them only en bloc, sometimes with success. See id. at 285-90; Morgan, Black
Society in the Lowcountry, 1760-1810, in Slavery and Freedom in the Age of the American
Revolution, supra note 3, at 125. If this tactic failed, it was sometimes possible to escape and
rejoin the family. Id. at 129.
98 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 6-10.
99 On the slaves' struggle to maintain traditional work rhythms and collective autonomy in
their work, see id. at 285-325.
100 V. Harding, supra note 38, at 11-15, 17-18, 20-22.
101 Id. at 30, 34, 39-40, 72-73 (maroon bands); Id. at 64, 81, 48-49, 109-11 (armed fugitives
joining or cooperating with Indian tribes). See also E. Genovese, From Rebellion to Revolu-
tion: Afro-American Slave Revolts in the Making of the Modern World 68-81 (1981) (maroon
communities in the American South and generally poor relations with Indian tribes); J. Oakes,
supra note 68, at 23-24 (early slave generations escape together in groups "reflecting their
communal heritage").
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to reconstitute the community of the slave ship.10 2 In addition, the
communities established by fugitives maintained African traditions
and political institutions. 0 3 Even those slaves and freedmen who re-
mained in the towns of colonial New England elected chiefs and es-
tablished their own courts. 10 4 Hence, it was not the experience of
slavery that forged Afro-Americans into a community-to the con-
trary, it was their deeply enculturated need for political association
that slavery frustrated.
As the institution of slavery spread during the early nineteenth
century, it became increasingly difficult to imagine fulfilling this need
in a country of captivity. Occasionally, slaves responded to this di-
lemma by initiating quixotic insurrections apparently aimed at purg-
ing an entire region of whites."°5 Many black abolitionists-most
notably Martin Delany and H. Ford Douglas-proposed ambitious
plans for emigration and the establishment of an Afro-American
polity beyond the reaches of white society. 106 These proposals were
inspired by the desire to be " 'a necessary constituent in the ruling
element of the country in which we live,' "1o combined with the belief
that "[n]o people ... can ever attain to greatness who lose their iden-
tity." ' 0  Others-perhaps inspired by the models of colonial New
England black communities-proposed a nationwide black political
association for mutual aid and defense, for education, and for eco-
nomic cooperation. More sanguine about America, these leaders-
including David Walker and Frederick Douglass-nevertheless envi-
sioned its thorough transformation." It should not be assumed,
however, that sovereignty was merely the utopian dream of a few am-
bitious leaders. Despite its daily frustration by slavery, collective sov-
ereignty was a value affirmed daily in the lives of the slaves.
While slavery degraded and separated the slaves, it could not
102 Morgan, supra note 97, at 131.
103 H. Gutman, supra note 38, at 332-33; E. Genovese, supra note 101, at 52-54.
104 H. Gutman, supra note 38, at 332-33.
105 E. Genovese, supra note 101, at 43 (New Orleans, 1811); id. at 129-30 (Camden, South
Carolina, 1816); V. Harding, supra note 38, at 55-57 (Gabriel Prosser, Henrico County Vir-
ginia, 1800); id. at 68-72 (Denmark Vesey, Charleston, 1822); id. at 94-99 (Nat Turner, South-
ampton County, Virginia, 1831); see generally E. Genovese, supra note 101, at 44-50 (Prosser,
Vesey, Turner). There were some early eighteenth-century forerunners of these "plots." See
V. Harding, supra note 38, at 32-33.
106 V. Harding, supra note 38, at 173-76, 184-92.
107 Id. at 191 (quoting the Cleveland Declaration in 1 Documentary History of the Negro
People in the United States 363-66 (H. Aptheker ed. 1951-74)).
108 Id. at 192.
109 Id. at 84-94 (Walker's proposal and attitude toward America); id. at 154-55 (Douglass's
attitude toward America); id. at 182-83 (proposal and attitude toward America of convention
organized by Douglass).
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eradicate their hunger for honor and community. The culture that
Africans developed in this country may have discarded many of the
particular customs and artifacts from their past, but it perpetuated the
communal process of creating new artifacts that they had known in
Africa.I" It was an oral culture, in which language-even prayer-
was always social, never private.11  Song, in particular, accompanied
nearly every activity, facilitating and ordering cooperation in work
and play.1 1 2 Yet song itself was the product of cooperative effort and
its collective improvisation often made religious worship a celebration
of community.' 
13
By constituting the slaves as a community of mutual respect, reli-
gious worship offered a spiritual context in which their wounded
honor could be healed. Patterson cites the theologian Olin P. Moyd
to the effect "that 'redemption is the root and core motif of black
theology' and that it means essentially liberation from sin and confed-
eration within the fellowship of black worshippers . *."..""4 Yet,
Genovese argues that Afro-American Christians never fully accepted
the concept of original sin and its corollary that the world that sur-
rounded them was profane.
Accordingly, they rejected the masters' gospel that slavery was
God's punishment of the guilty, and instead saw slavery in traditional
African terms as shameful, a condition of dishonor. 5 Hence, what
the slaves sought from Jesus was redemption of their honor. They
believed that through Christ each could vicariously choose death
before dishonor and earn release from the cowardly contract." 6
What they asked of Jesus was the recognition denied them by their
masters;1 7 his answer, as they understood it, was a command to "love
one another."'1 8 When the living offered insufficient solace, slaves
could turn, like their African forebears, to the dead. Their own ances-
tors promised to return, like Jesus, to judge and redeem: "The ghosts
of loved ones frequently returned to render aid and protection ....
110 L. Levine, supra note 38, at 4-5.
11 Id. at 157-59; E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 432.
112 L. Levine, supra note 38, at 208-15 (work songs); id. at 148-49 (ring game).
113 Id. at 26-30 (slave spirituals); id. at 188-89 (twentieth-century gospel songs).
114 0. Patterson, supra note 17, at 75.
115 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 208-09 (white preachers told slaves their oppression was
deserved in God's eyes); id. at 211-12, 247 (slave rejection of concepts of guilt and sin in favor
of shame); see also D. Davis, supra note 28, at 84-85 ("In the eyes of Christians the independ-
ent, natural man . . . was a sinner."); 0. Patterson, supra note 17, at 70-71 (one strand of
Christianity sees all men as slave to sin and redeems them by offering them slavery to God).
116 0. Patterson, supra note 17, at 71, 75.
117 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 25.
118 Id. at 265.
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Some satisfaction was taken, too, in stories of dead slaves who re-
turned to demand justice from the whites who had abused or killed
them."" 9
Just as masters owed their dead victims compensation, the slaves
owed their ancestors respect and gratitude.' 20 Hence, along with their
demands for emancipation, they insisted upon reparations as a matter
of honor and filial piety. After emancipation, one planter offered to
employ two of his former slaves. They sent him an invoice for some
$12,000:
We have concluded to test your sincerity by asking you to send us
our wages for the time we served you.... If you fail to pay us for
faithful labors in the past we can have little faith in your promises
in the future. We trust the good Maker has opened your eyes to
the wrongs which you and your fathers have done to me and my
fathers, in making us toil for you for generations without
recompense. 12
More commonly the demand for reparations was focused on land
rather than money. 122 This was because, as good republicans, freed-
men associated land with economic autonomy. 23 "We all got a right
to de tree ob life" went one spiritual. 124 But while "there was desire
for the thing whites possessed" they were sought in different ways.
125
In the slaves' famed Brer Rabbit tales, "what Rabbit craves is not
possession but power .... 126 Unlike white republicans, freedmen
did not necessarily idealize individual independence-instead, they
sought mutual protection and support in self-governing farming com-
munities. 127 Thus, freedslaves sought political association as part of
their conception of freedom.
For the slaves, emancipation marked the birth of a new polity,
constituted by a raft of "Freedmen's Conventions."'' 28 These were
soon followed by proliferation of "Union Leagues," mutual aid socie-
119 L. Levine, supra note 38, at 79.
120 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 212-13.
121 L. Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long: The Aftermath of Slavery 334 (1979).
122 E. Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 4, at 69, 80-83; V. Harding, supra note 38, at 263,
265, 269, 297, 304, 315-16, 319-20.
123 E. Foner, Reconstruction, supra note 4, at 44, 72-73.
124 L. Levine, supra note 38, at 39.
125 Id. at 139.
126 Id. at 109.
127 See V. Harding, supra note 38, at 233 (discussing self-governing contraband camps, dur-
ing civil war); id. at 263-64 (delegation of black leaders requests land on which to "live to-
gether," "reap the fruit of our own labor," and "take care of ourselves."); id. at 268-71
(discussion of several black organized self-governing farming communities on confiscated land
at end of civil war).
128 L. Litwack, supra note 121, at 502-04.
1455
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1435
ties, and political clubs among blacks. 129 They showed interest in tak-
ing on another of the attributes of sovereignty, offering to "assist the
government" in defending their freedom, and frequently acting in col-
lective self-defense in the absence of government protection. 3 ' Fi-
nally, the newly freed slaves sought each other's company in a new
and heretofore forbidden context: almost universally, they demanded
education."' Because the education they expected-and got-was
generally segregated132 and often supervised by black teachers, 133 the
slaves' pursuit of education created contexts for the development of
black community and black leadership.
Africans may not have developed a conception of freedom until
they became Afro-Americans-but the conception of freedom they
offered America was inspired by the community, sovereignty, and his-
tory they had left behind in Africa.
VI. BEYOND INDEPENDENCE: THE MASTERS' FREEDOM
Dynamic supplier of a growing world market in cotton, the ante-
bellum South was not exactly the insulated organic society of legend.
On the other hand, West Africa, supplier of a growing world market
in slaves, did not remain insulated or unchanged either. Yet members
of both societies developed and maintained timocratic and communi-
tarian values that consoled them in the face of the atomization of their
social worlds. 134 Slaves to commerce, Southern planters quixotically
129 V. Harding, supra note 38, at 289-90.
130 Id. at 233, 263, 297, 304-06.
131 Id. at 233, 264, 297, 308; L. Litwack, supra note 121, at 335, 472-76. Revolutionary era
blacks had demanded education as a right. Quarles, supra note 3, at 297-98.
132 L. Levine, supra note 38, at 140.
133 L. Litwack, supra note 121, at 494-500.
134 James Oakes, noting the relentless dynamism of Southern society and restless acquisi-
tiveness of slaveholders denies that slaveholding encouraged community, paternalism, or re-
spect for tradition. Instead, he claims, these were common values of the colonial period that
slaveholding "debilitated." J. Oakes, supra note 68, at 67-68, 192-96. Oakes is certainly cor-
rect that paternalism and community were pervasive values in colonial society even where
there was little slaveholding. See R. Steinfeld, The Disappearance of Indentured Servitude
(forthcoming 1989) (paternalism); Mensch, The Colonial Origins of Liberal Property Rights,
31 Buffalo L. Rev. 635 (1983) (community). What Oakes fails to consider is the possibility
that it was the very mobility and opportunity created for Southern whites by slavery, that
enabled them to afford and preserve these values. Basil Davidson notes that:
There is scarcely a modern African people without a more or less vivid tradition
that speaks of movement from another place. Younger sons of paramount chiefs
would hive off their followers, and become paramount themselves in a new
land....
But this wandering of peoples clearly acted as a powerful preserver of the old
system of "tribal-feudal" relationships, for it gave play to an elasticity and toler-
ance that could absorb and eliminate strains and stresses which must otherwise
have forced a social crisis.
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came to define their freedom in terms of independence of the North's
market society, while rejecting the ideal of independence.
At the heart of the Southern conception of freedom lay an obses-
sive concern for honor. According to Bertram Wyatt-Brown, the
Southerners' sense of honor, like that of sub-Saharan Africans, was
bound up with kinship. To be without family was to be without op-
portunites to demonstrate honor, and without a community to recog-
nize it.' 35 In the South, then, as in Africa, to be without kinship was
to be socially dead. In such societies a stigma was affixed to anyone
deemed "powerless and untrustworthy, having no relative to stand
guardian, no dependent to be defended, a task that was a duty confer-
ring honor."' 6 Slaves were paradigmatically honorless, 137 and were
viewed as unfit to swear the oaths by which voluntary (as opposed to
coerced) bonds of fidelity, association, and kinship were estab-
lished. 138 By contrast, every family member, friend, and fellow officer
could testify to the worth of a free man's word or the purity of a free
woman's virtue. "[T]hose with numerous kinspeople were assumed to
have moral stalwartness [but] [1]iving up to the familial ideals was...
a common requirement.'
139
Accordingly, white Southerners, like black Southerners "revered
the dead"; yet the dead's social function was not so much magical
protection, as instruction. "The living were the dead, the dead the
living when old Southerners recalled the adventures and deceased he-
roes of their youth . . . ." ' The demeanor, the valor, the social im-
portance of the dead were invoked or invented by the old to impress
and inspire the young.
Hence, the masters lived in an "oral society, where words
B. Davidson, supra note 80, at 48. Southern society, like African, was a constant competition
for aristocracy among common men. Southerners hewed to the ever-receding frontier, not
because they cared little for society, but in the hopes of establishing a society-perhaps popu-
lated mostly by their slaves-that cared for them. Along the way they invented the traditions
they preserved, but what tradition isn't invented to substitute for past and place? Bonnie
Menes Kahn tells us that the warm "village communities" recreated in New York's Little Italy
and Boston's North End never existed in rural southern Italy. See B. Kahn, Cosmopolitan
Culture: The Gilt-Edged Dream of a Tolerant City 231-37 (1987).
135 Courage in the old South... was a personal attribute, but it could not be wholly
separated from the familial context. Therefore it was important to have kinsfolk
who needed valorous protection and who could undertake justifiable revenge ....
Without relatives one was helpless, and shorn of a major reason to exist.
B. Wyatt-Brown, Southern Honor 43 (1982).
136 Id. at 44.
137 Id. at 46.
138 Id. at 57-58.
139 Id. at 44.
140 Id. at 45.
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and gestures counted [for] much." '141 Ken Greenberg notes that
"throughout the process of education antebellum South Carolinians
made no real distinction between learning (moral and practical) and
speech."'' 42 A leading periodical of the antebellum South explained
that "Virginia has a system of oral instruction which compensates for
the want of schools-her social intercourse."' 43 What children were
expected to absorb, however, were less the propositions debated, than
the grace with which they were expressed. "Statesmen were supposed
to deliver orations-not public speeches but orations .... What was
different about an oration was that one of its primary functions was to
inspire respect, even awe for the speaker in the minds of the
listeners.''144
Ancestor worship and oral testimony were just two firmaments
in a Southern religious cosmos shared by black and white alike.
Southerners of neither color were overly affected with asceticism.
Southern worship, according to essayist James Dabbs, is "concern[ed]
with the world as something valuable in itself."' 45 The Southerner
"did not have to choose this world or another."' 146 While white
Southerners lectured their slaves that slavery was an appropriate con-
dition for hopeless sinners, their own sense of sin was nearly as atten-
uated as that of their slaves. 'Each believed that Christ had redeemed
them from such slavery by honorably dying in their place. 147 Where
the slave sought in Christianity a spiritual restoration of honor lost,
the master sought a talisman against the dread loss of honor he wit-
nessed everywhere around him. 148 He was like the Ruandan noble,
pledging his fealty to a still stronger master, for fear of being left
alone, without protection.
141 Id. at 330. See also id. at 47 (white South an oral society).
142 K. Greenberg, Masters and Statesmen: The Political Culture of American Slavery 12
(1985).
143 B. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 135, at 47 (quoting 7 De Bow's Review 312 (1849)).
144 K. Greenberg, supra note 142, at 12.
145 J. Dabbs, Who Speaks for the South? 4 (1964).
146 Id.
147 0. Patterson, supra note 17, at 75:
[T]he masters, among themselves, could find both spritual and personal dignity
and salvation in [this] ethic of the justified and redeemed sinner. The crucified
Jesus as redeemer and liberator from enslavement to sin supported a proud, free
group of people with a highly developed sense of their own dignity and worth.
Similarly, the slaves in the silence of their souls and among themselves with their
own preachers, could find salvation and dignity in this same interpretation of the
crucified Lord.
148 See E. Morgan, supra note 3, at 376 (masters developed their conception of liberty in
reaction to the spectacle of slavery).
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A. Dueling, Honor, and Social Death
Like praising Jesus or raising the genteel dead, dueling was a
symbolic .ritual masters employed to reassure themselves of their
honor. Ken Greenberg sees the duel as Hegel's primal struggle-to-
the-death to avoid the loss of honor associated with the cowardly
contract.
Masters in virtually all slave societies think of slaves as having cho-
sen a subservient life-a life without honor, a social death-in or-
der to avoid a real death. It is the slave's fear of actual death that
(according to the mythology of masters) makes him a slave. Mas-
ters on the other hand do not have this fear. And, of course, the
duel perfectly demonstrates this. After facing death, the duelist is
reborn into the world ready to assume his position as a master.'
49
All masters tended to imagine the slave as all they felt they were
not. 150 White Southerners imagined the slave as one who preferred
social death to actual death because social death was what the master
feared above all: "the most pressing Southern fear was not death so
much as dying alone," concludes Wyatt-Brown.'
Dueling, though it involved the risk of death, insured that one
would not die in isolation and disrepute. "Duelists were in a common
club," reasons Greenberg, "a club of self-professed gentlemen. To
duel was to join the club."'5 While the duelists automatically in-
curred each other's respect, 53 they sought and got the esteem of a
much wider company. Dueling affirmed the master's status as fit to
master slaves and to participate in politics, and "yet, each [of the par-
ties in a duel] depended on community opinion to confirm his sta-
tus."' 54 Gaining recognition as a duelist required the cooperation of
aggrieved parties, seconds, note bearers, kin, witnesses to the original
insult, witnesses to the subsequent negotiations, witnesses to the duel
itself, and often readers of newspapers and posters.'55 Hence Wyatt-
Brown speculates that duels and other less overtly hostile encounters
"helped Southerners determine community standing and reaffirm
their membership in the immediate circle to which they belonged. In
all of them honor and pursuit of place muted the threat of being alone
and provided the chance to enjoy power in fellowship."'
156
149 K. Greenberg, supra note 142, at 40 (footnotes omitted).
150 O. Patterson, supra note 17, at 84-85 (Fulani of Upper Volta region).
151 B. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 135, at 329.
152 K. Greenberg, supra note 142, at 33.
153 Id. at 37.
154 Id. at ix.
155 Id. at 25.
156 B. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 135, at 331.
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It was this constant, anxious competition for "power in fellow-
ship"-a quest for self, utterly dependent on a collectively con-
structed community always dissolving into dust, heat, and violence-
that the masters exalted as their freedom. It was not that they es-
chewed the republican obsession with independence shared by their
heroes in colonial Virginia and their enemies in the antebellum North.
After all, one secessionist defined liberty as "'[t]he Right every man
has ... to enjoy the fruits of his own labour, art and industry; to work
for his own profit and pleasures and not for others.' "157 Yet they
recognized, as their Northern neighbors did not, that such economic
independence could not be universalized in a market society, that it
was dependent on exploitation. They recognized, moreover, that the
independence even of masters was limited by their need for commu-
nity. This recognition is rendered visible by Genovese's penetrating
analysis of the proslavery ideology of George Fitzhugh. Genovese
characterizes Fitzhugh's conception of human nature as essentially
social:
The most helpless of animals, thought Fitzhugh, was the isolated,
"individualized" man. In Sociology for the South, he denounced
Locke's theory of social contract and argued that man was natu-
rally a slave of society and had no rights to surrender to it. "Man
is born a member of society and does not form society."
15 8
My contention is not that Southerners realized Fitzhugh's fantasy of a
harmonious and organic society; it is that they found this fantasy ap-
pealing because they lived in desperate fear of the isolation that rural
life often entails.
The comings and goings of relatives and friends, the thin excuses to
go up to the courthouse, the interminable "friendly" games, and
the personal contests of arms and fists attested not only to
Southerners' desperate need to conquer ennui but also their com-
pulsion to find social place in the midst of gatherings. That was
the great charm of the South, the willingness to create good times
with others, but behind that trait was fear of being left alone,
bored, and depressed. 59
Despite their greed, pride, mobility, and physical isolation,
Southerners neither aspired to stand alone, nor admired those who
did.
157 K. Greenberg, supra note 142, at 87 (quoting an unnamed secessionist).
158 E. Genovese, The World the Slaveholders Made 158 (1969) (quoting G. Fitzhugh, Soci-
ology for the South 25 (1854)).
159 B. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 135, at 329.
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B. Independence and Community
For Greenberg, Southern culture was driven by a contradiction
between the republican desire for independence and the timocratic de-
sire for power and esteem. The solution was the sentimental descrip-
tion of the South as an organic community striving for collective
independence from the grasping, competitive North. "Slavery pro-
vided the social setting that permitted the imagination of a 'commu-
nity,' both for masters and for slaves."' 6° Masters wanted to imagine
Southern society as the sort of hierarchical but nonetheless demo-
cratic, communal, and humane society that-unbeknownst to them-
characterized Africa before the advent of the mass slave trade. Their
self-images required their membership in a community; their political
rhetoric insisted upon their independence. Their solution to this con-
tradiction was an awkward synthesis described by Charles Sellers.
Never discarding the ideal of independence, the masters "transformed
it, substituting for the old emphasis on the natural rights of all men a
new emphasis on the rights and autonomy of communities.""16 Ac-
cordingly, in seceding, slaveholders could collectively reject what they
insisted was a cowardly contract with the North: " 'I would rather my
state should be the graveyard of martyred patriots than the slave of
northern abolitionists,'" proclaimed one son of South Carolina.
162
Greenberg sees Hegel's dialectic of master and slave as providing
a powerful metaphor for this predicament of the masters. "Masters
are always in search of power and independence," but because power
inevitably involves dependence on others, masters also "create condi-
tions that constantly make them aware of their dependence. ' 163 Ac-
cording to Greenberg, this contradiction was expressed in Southern
political culture as ambivalence about republicanism164 My own
view is that republicanism was itself highly ambivalent about indepen-
dence and had a long history of privileging communal over individual
autonomy.1 65 Regardless of their precise understanding of republi-
canism, the masters had little respect for the independence of their
fellow citizens. Here, too, they aspired to mastery: while they some-
160 K. Greenberg, supra note 142, at 84.
161 Sellers, The Travail of Slavery, in The Southerner as American 42 (C. Sellers ed. 1960).
162 K. Greenberg, supra note 142, at 86 (quoting Lawrence M. Keitt).
163 Id. at viii.
164 Greenberg argues: "To the extent that a search for honor involves a concern for personal
autonomy and a distrust of power, it is compatible with the republican tradition. But since,
the search for honor equally involves the assertion of power over others, it is also in tension
with republicanism." Id. at xi (citing Orlando Patterson).
165 See generally G. Binder, Treaty Conflict and Political Contradiction 72-76 (1988) (re-
publicanism and communal autonomy).
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times described their political participation as "service," they also
viewed it as governance. Hence "the statesman was a kind of teacher,
perhaps even a kind of father, whose function involved guiding the
masses in the direction of their true interests." 166 At the same time,
Southern statesmen recognized that their authority to govern pro-
ceeded from their honor, that is, the esteem of their community.
Upon his retirement from politics, John Randolph expected to "'re-
turn to the bosom of my constituents ... and receive from them the
only reward I ever looked for, but the highest man can receive-the
universal expression of their approbation and thanks.' "167
The masters sought to exercise a similar form of authority over
their slaves. 168 Just as they congratulated themselves on their instruc-
tion and protection of their constituents, they reassured themselves
that their helpless slaves could hardly survive without them. Accord-
ingly, Southern ideologues defended slavery as a kind of benevolent
governance involving "political obligations" to act in the interests of
the slaves and keep the peace among them. One Baptist minister
rhapsodized "that slaves 'become part of his [master's] family, (the
whole, forming under him a little community).' "169 Propagandist
Henry Hughes developed his own delicate euphemism: "Warrantors
and warrantees are wedded in interest. The sovereign warrantor is
therefore, the petitioner for redress of all grievances by others than
himself."170 Such encomiums gratified the masters because they
could not openly solicit the esteem of their slaves. Still, argues Green-
berg, "masters, like statesman,... sought honor. They aimed to exer-
cise authority through the public display of superior virtue and
intelligence. They constantly wanted to win the respect and admira-
tion of their 'people.' "9171
For Southern whites, to be free was to exercise sovereignty, and
to exercise sovereignty was to be master. For Southerners then, as for
their Northern neighbors, freedom required exploitation, but it did
not ultimately require independence. It was his very immersion in a
network of kinship and community that fitted the master to rule.
The white Southerner's identification of freedom with political
and social community is illustrated by three famous Supreme Court
opinions by Southern justices-one of them, justly the most reviled in
166 K. Greenberg, supra note 142, at 6; see also id. at viii-ixm 3 (statesman as master).
167 B. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 135, at 45-46 (quoting John Randolph).
168 K. Greenberg, supra note 142, at 97.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 98.
171 Id. at 21-22.
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Supreme Court history, the other two, justly among the most
celebrated.
In his famous Dred Scott opinion,I72 Roger Brooke Taney1
73 of-
fered a "sectional credo no less revealing than Lincoln's House Di-
vided address or a series of Greeley editorials. It is not only a
statement of southern assumptions and arguments but also an expres-
sion of the southern mood ... in the late stages of national crisis.'
'1 74
That credo held that the enslavement of some blacks could only be
justified by the noncitizenship of the entire black people, whether
slave or free. Justice Taney found that noncitizenship was exemplified
by a host of legal disabilities facing free blacks in Northern states at
the time of the framing of the Constitution, including the denial of
"political" and "social" rights-military service, education, and mar-
riage-that continued to be denied or limited after emancipation. 75
While white women and children suffered many of these same civil
disabilities, Taney included them as members of "the political fam-
ily,"1176 a status blacks were clearly denied, Taney felt, by antimis-
cegenation statutes:
They show that a perpetual and impassable barrier was intended to
be erected between the white race and the one which they had re-
duced to slavery, and governed as subjects.., and which they then
looked upon as so far below them in the scale of created beings,
that intermarriages ... were regarded as unnatural and immoral
177
For Taney, subjection without kinship, exclusion without sovereignty,
constituted a condition of social death. Only people who were utterly
172 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
173 Taney, born in 1777, was a Maryland Democrat from an old Catholic tobacco planting
family. He served on the Court from 1836 until his death in 1864. "Taney joined the coloniza-
tion society and freed those slaves he inherited. Yet he would not support any proposals which
called for the federal government to limit the institution." Gatell, Roger B. Taney, in 1 The
Justices of the United States Supreme Court 1789-1969, at 635, 637 (L. Friedman & F. Israel
eds. 1969).
174 D. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics
337 (1978).
175 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 408, 409, 413, 416 (marriage); id. at 414 (education); id. at 415
(military service).
176 Id. at 422.
177 Id. at 409. Distaste for miscegenation is the recurring theme in the statutory language
quoted by Taney. Taney quotes a Maryland statute, dealing exclusively with intermarriage, id.
at 408, and a Massachusetts "act for the better preventing of a spurious and mixed issue." Id.
Later, while detailing other civil disabilities he twice returns to the subject, quoting a later
Massachusetts statute, id. at 413 and a Rhode Island statute, id. at 416. For a similar reading
of these aspects of Taney's opinion see Ray, The Figure in the Judicial Carpet: Images of
Family and State in Supreme Court Opinions, 37 J. Legal Educ. 331, 334-38.
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isolated, outside of any network of protection could be enslaved-and
such persons could not be considered citizens.
Thus, while native Americans were also subject to civil disabili-
ties, Taney did not forever banish them from "the political family."
Instead, he viewed them like white children, as in a state of "pupil-
age." 17 8 Unlike Afro-Americans, Taney argued, native Americans
could be naturalized into citizenship because they were members of a
"free and independent people, associated together in nations or tribes,
and governed by their own laws." '179 For that reason also, he implied
(without much historical accuracy) that native Americans could not
be enslaved. 180 Having "formed no part of the colonial communities,
and never amalgamated with them in social connections or in govern-
ment,"' 18 1 native Americans were not, as yet, members of the white
political family. Nevertheless they were potentially admissible, by
statute rather than constitutional amendment, because they were
members of their own self-governing association-their own political
family.
In drawing this distinction, Taney expressed the sentimental im-
age of native Americans as sturdy republicans that warmed many a
Southern heart. One colonial Virginian described the Chickahominies
as a "'stout, daring and free People,... governed in a Republican
Form.' "182 Even slaves sometimes imagined the tribes as utopias be-
yond the reach of white authority, where they could aspire to mem-
bership and mastery. One popular slave song went:
Harper's creek and roarin ribber
Thar my dear, we'll live forebber
Den we'll go to de Ingin nation
All I want in dis creation
Is pretty little wife and big plantation.18 3
178 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404.
179 Id. at 403.
180 "[T]he traffic in slaves in the United States had always been confined to [Africans]." Id.
at 411. Yet native Americans had enslaved one another before contact with Europeans. Like
African slavery, however, native American slavery was not traditionally commercial or even
economic in function. See 0. Patterson, supra note 17, at 84 (Northwest coast tribes); J.
Oakes, supra note 68, at 45 (Cherokee). There were isolated instances of European settlers
enslaving native Americans or purchasing them as slaves. See E. Morgan, supra note 3, at 99-
100 (enslavement of native Americans in colonial Virginia); J. Oakes, supra note 68, at 45
(purchase of Cherokee slaves). In general, because native American slaves were more skilled
at escape than at agricultural labor, they were soon replaced with African slaves. V. Harding,
supra note 38, at 7. Ultimately many Cherokee purchased Africans after being induced to
settle on farms. J. Oakes, supra note 68, at 45-47.
181 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 403.
182 E. Morgan, supra note 3, at 372.
183 Slave song, reprinted in L. Levine, supra note 38, at 14. Free blacks in fact owned slaves
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Taney was not alone among Southerners in defining freedom as par-
ticipation in both sovereignty and society, and in understanding slav-
ery as exclusion from both.
One other Southerner who shared these conceptions of freedom
and slavery was the first Justice Harlan. Himself a slaveholder,
Harlan was a proslavery unionist during the Civil War, who opposed
ratification of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments because he
understood them to require full integration of blacks into Southern
society."8 4 Nevertheless, he later became the author of dissenting
opinions in the Civil Rights Cases185 and Plessy v. Ferguson, 86 which
remain the most ambitious interpretations of the emancipation
amendments to ever find expression on the Supreme Court. Viewing
these amendments as a constitutional response to the Dred Scott deci-
sion, Harlan read them to create a national obligation to reverse the
exclusion of blacks from sovereignty and society that, according to
Taney, made slavery culturally possible. 87 Thus in Harlan's view,
emancipation not only automatically entailed the citizenship denied
by Taney,188 but it also decreed thereby that "there cannot be, in this
republic, any class of human beings in practical subjection to another
class."1
8 9
In his Plessy dissent, Harlan repeated that the Civil War amend-
ments were designed to eradicate the social conditions celebrated in
Dred Scott. "The destinies of the two races, in this country, [were]
indissolubly linked together" by the "legitimate results of the war," 190
in which blacks "risked their lives for the preservation of the
Union."'' Having thus entered "the political community,"' 92 their
in Louisiana and South Carolina, sometimes to facilitate their manumission, but sometimes to
employ them as laborers. See F. Boney, supra note 38, at 157; J. Oakes, supra note 68, at 47-
49.
184 Justice John M. Harlan was born in 1833 and died in 1911. See Filler, John M. Harlan,
in 2 The Justices of the United States Supreme Court, supra note 173, at 1281-95; Westin, John
Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes: The Transformation of a South-
erner, 66 Yale L.J. 637 (1957).
185 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
186 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
187 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 30-33 (discussion of the Dred Scott case); id. at 36-37
(emancipation required eliminating social inferiority on which slavery rested); id. at 46 (na-
tional power to create affirmative condition of citizenship); see Kinoy, The Constitutional
Right of Negro Freedom, 21 Rutgers L. Rev. 387, 393-96 (1967).
188 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 36 (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1866, recog-
nizing black citizenship, was passed pursuant to the enabling clause of the thirteenth
amendment).
189 Id. at 62.
190 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 560.
191 Id. at 561.
192 Id. at 563.
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exclusion as inferior became "inconsistent with ... a republican form
of government."
93
Harlan's interpretation of emancipation as the full integration of
blacks into American society reflected a Southern understanding of
slavery as a form of "social death." For Harlan, freedom involved
inclusion rather than independence. He emphatically rejected his col-
leagues' conclusions that progressive labor legislation made workers
''wards of the state" and that civil rights legislation made blacks
"wards of the government."' 94 Given the historical reality of slavery
known to Southerners like Harlan, emancipation entailed an aggres-
sive role for government in fostering the social conditions for full
political membership in society. Nothing less would occasion the cul-
tural transformation throughout the South that Harlan's own odyssey
exemplified. Yet Harlan's odyssey had not been a long one: his trans-
formation into the most radical of republicans was as swift and sud-
den as crossing the railroad in a sleepy Southern town, or stepping
from the parlor into the kitchen of his own home. Accustomed to the
freedom claimed by the masters, he had little difficulty appreciating
the freedom demanded by the slaves.
VII. THE MASTERS MASTERED: How THE SLAVES CIVILIZED
THE SOUTH
It is no accident that Southern whites shared a communitarian
conception of freedom with Afro-Americans. Eugene Genovese has
argued that the slavemasters borrowed much of their cultural values
from the slaves. The work rhythms of Southern society were not sim-
ply imposed from above but reflected compromises in an ongoing and
uneasy struggle. 95 The paternalism that characterized Southern so-
ciety was such a product as well. Demeaning as that paternalism
might have been, it served the slaves in several ways: it obligated mas-
ters to support their slaves in old age,' 96 to side with their slaves
against unusually abusive overseers, 197 and to accede to demands if
couched as humble appeals for favors. 19 Even paternalism's revolt-
ing corollary-that slaves were high-spirited, if irresponsible chil-
193 Id. at 564.
194 Compare dissents by Harlan with majority opinions in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 65 (1905) (majority finds maximum hours law would make workers wards of the state) and
Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 20 (1906) (majority finds federal prohibition on private
interference with labor contracts would make black workers wards of government).
195 See E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 285-324.
196 Id. at 521.
197 Id. at 17-21.
198 Id. at 91, 146-48; B. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 135, at 408-09.
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dren-had advantages. It provided an arsenal of excuses to escape
punishment for resisting the slave regimen. It also lulled whites into
carelessness. Behind its protective camouflage, slaves could meet,
plan, learn, worship, resist, sabotage, steal, shirk, escape, or even kill.
What made paternalism capable of working to the slaves' advantage is
that for the masters, at least as much as for the slaves, it provided an
identity. Masters were psychologically invested in their view of the
slaves as children as well as their view of themselves as benevolent
patriarchs. They justified slavery on the grounds that their slaves
needed them, and they justified their own power among whites on the
grounds that they showed virtue and responsibility in the treatment of
their slaves.
These values were learned in part from their slaves whose fore-
bears had come from the "personalistic" societies described by Patter-
son.'9 9 Possibly the slaves viewed paternalism as a more desirable
form of subjection than others; more likely the masters observed, ad-
mired, and envied the way that their slaves honored one another, par-
ticularly those whom they esteemed or invested with authority. 2°° It
seems probable that it was precisely because they did recognize their
slaves that masters craved and demanded such recognition from
them.
The claim that Southern whites derived their values of honor,
responsibility, and community-the very qualities that they identified
with mastery-from their slaves seems paradoxical. Few of us are
wholly unaffected by the lengthy tradition of styling the masters as
wise and benevolent educators and civilizers of their slaves.2 °1 Under
the influence of this tradition, many white chroniclers have attributed
cultural similarities among Southern whites and Southern blacks to
white influence on blacks, without even considering the opposite
explanation.2 °2
The conclusion that slaves "must have" imitated masters is cer-
tainly supported by the reasonable assumption that racism would
have inhibited masters from openly imitating their slaves. Neverthe-
less, it is belied by the reality that considerations of both pride and
prudence also operated to inhibit slaves from openly imitating their
199 See supra text accompanying note 83.
200 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 118 (slaves treated each other with impressive courtesy);
id. at 339 (slaves admired house servants as genteel); L. Levine, supra note 38, at 139 (chief
role models for slaves were other blacks).
201 D. Davis, supra note 28, at 200-06, 217; D. Davis, Slavery and Human Progress 60, 129
(1984); E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 75-86; H. Gutman, supra note 38, at 531-44.
202 H. Gutman, supra note 38, at 31-32 (describing tradition of attributing similarity to
white influence); L. Levine, supra note 38, at 20-21.
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masters.2"' The existence of white racism does not justify the assump-
tion that masters could not have learned from slaves. It does, how-
ever, suggest that such learning will seldom have been openly
acknowledged. Yet, an abundance of indirect evidence indicates that
Southern whites were capable of appreciating and absorbing the cul-
tural gifts of their subject people.
Opportunities abounded for antebellum whites to absorb black
culture. Accustomed as we are to life in a racially segregated society,
we may easily assume that the caste society of the old South allowed
little social interaction between the races.2 °" While there were cer-
tainly slaves that had little contact with whites,2 °5 most Southern
whites had some contact with slaves. During the half-century
preceeding the Civil War, a majority of Southern whites held, hired,
or drove slaves at one time or another.20 6 Although as many as half
of all slaves may have been held by "planters," most slaveholders
were small farmers exploiting the services of a handful of slaves.20 7
On small farms, slaves and owners were in constant contact, sharing
tasks, living quarters, and food.208 On larger plantations, slaves had
primary responsibility for raising the master's children and accompa-
nied him and his family constantly, even while they slept.209 White
children grew to adulthood playing with slaves, following the direc-
tion and admonitions of slaves, sharing their confidences with slaves,
soliciting advice from their slaves on the choice of a dress-or a
mate.210 Nor were their parents immune from similar influence.
211
Especially in the cities there were many sexual liaisons between the
races, some romances, and a few marriages.21 2 While Stanley Elkins's
claim that masters constituted most slaves' only "significant others"
must be discarded, slaves clearly provided significant others for most
whites in the antebellum South.213
When it served their economic interests, whites were not too
203 See, e.g., L. Levine, supra note 38, at 96-97 (discussion of folk tale entitled "The Fatal
Imitation").
204 Elkins viewed slaves as so socially isolated that he analogized them to concentration
camp inmates. S. Elkins, supra note 32, at 104.
205 This was especially true in the Carolina low country, which was characterized by large
plantations and absentee planters. See E. Foner, Nothing But Freedom, supra note 4, at 82;
W. Rose, Slavery and Freedom 58-70 (1982).
206 J. Oakes, supra note 68, at 40-41.
207 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 7, 12.
208 Id. at 7-9.
209 Id. at 336, 343.
210 Id. at 515; W. Cash, The Mind of the South 51 (1941).
211 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 343-47.
212 Id. at 413-30.
213 S. Elkins, supra note 32, at 119-39.
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proud to learn from slaves. Slaves brought unique agricultural, ar-
tisanal, and metallurgical skills with them from Africa,21 4 which
helped shape Southern economic development. Especially during the
colonial period, some regions were entirely dependent upon slaves for
the performance of skilled labor.2"5 Sometimes slave artisans were
asked to teach their skills to whites.2 1 6 In agriculture, slaves collec-
tively influenced the rhythms of work,217 the organization of labor,21 8
and sometimes techniques of cultivation. In South Carolina, for ex-
ample, the cultivation of rice was made possible by the use of African
techniques.21 9 Often favorite individual slaves were consulted on the
overall management of some plantations.22 °
Yet Afro-American influence on the lives of Southern whites was
not circumscribed by their economic significance. It permeated the
way Southern whites talked, the food they ate, the music they en-
joyed, and the stories they heard as children.22 1 If constant contact
with slaves influenced the tastes to which Southern whites accus-
tomed themselves, can we conclude that Afro-American influence on
Southern culture extended to its most deeply held values?
We can. Evangelical Christianity, the central matrix of Southern
values, was as much a black creation as a white one. During the
eighteenth-century "Great Awakening" of evangelism in America,
blacks "were commonly present at religious revivals and regular
church services alongside whites throughout the South. '22 2 The
"small, voluntary, religious societies, ' 223 generated by the eighteenth
century spread of Baptism and Methodism were biracial, creating op-
portunities for "shared emotion and ecstatic behavior." But if the
charismatic ethos of these movements stimulated interracial commu-
nity, that ethos was a black innovation, which sometimes "startled
white onlookers. ' 224 As one slave insisted, "'the angels shout in
214 B. Davidson, supra note 80, at 17; E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 389.
215 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 388; Macleod, Toward Caste, in Slavery and Freedom in
the Age of the American Revolution, supra note 3, at 227; Quarles, supra note 3, at 286.
216 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 395.
217 Id. at 285-309.
218 H. Gutman, supra note 38, at 309-11; Morgan, supra note 97, at 125.
219 F. Boney, supra note 38, at 150; J. Oakes, supra note 68, at 24.
220 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 313, 347, 366, 381.
221 Id. at 540-43 (African origin of such favorite Southern dishes as "barbecue"); id. at 364
(folklore, speech patterns); F. Boney, supra note 38, at 150-51 (folklore, phrases); W. Cash,
supra note 210, at 51 (accent).
222 L. Levine, supra note 38, at 21.
223 Raboteau, The Slave Church in the Era of the American Revolution, in Slavery and
Freedom in the Age of the American Revolution, supra note 3, at 194-95, 200.
224 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 238; see also id. at 233-34, 240 (slaves rarely allowed
white onlookers to witness the true frenzy reached in their prayer meetings); L. Levine, supra
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heaven .... The Lawd said you gotta shout if you want to be
saved.' "225
Whites found the joyous community created by their black
coparishioners irresistible. The renowned diarist Mary Boykin Chest-
nut recalled that one such interracial service was "'a little too excit-
ing for me. I would very much have liked to shout too.' 226 The
wealth of such accounts "make[s] it clear that even outsiders had diffi-
culty resisting the centripetal pull of black religious services and
song. "227 White Southerners were especially impressed with black
religious music and borrowed it enthusiastically. The characteristi-
cally African verse forms and rhythms of many spirituals sung by
nineteenth-century Christians of both races shows their Afro-Ameri-
can composition. 221 "'Who are the true rulers?'" asked a Northern
journalist in 1845. "'The negro poets to be sure.... Let one of them,
in the swamps of Carolina, compose a new song, and it no sooner
reaches the ear of a white amateur, than it is written down, amended
(that is, almost spoilt), printed and then put upon a course of rapid
dissemination .... 229
For white Baptists and Methodists, slaves were often more than
inspiring coworshippers. Albert Raboteau tells us that in evangelical
movements, "slaves achieved new status as active and frequently
founding members of churches. 23 ° In addition, blacks preached to
mixed and even all white congregations, where their eloquence and
fervor were much admired. 231 The similarly charismatic style eventu-
ally developed by white evangelists was regarded by W.E.B. Du Bois
as a "plain copy" of black preaching. 232 As the most oft-heard form
of oratory in the antebellum South, "[ilt is impossible to believe," that
sermons-influenced by Afro-American styles of speech and wor-
ship-"did not.., add much to that great tradition of southern ora-
tory ordinarily attributed solely to white men of power and
standing. "233
Any resulting similarity between black religious and white polit-
note 38, at 23, 163-64 (while melodies of spirituals are similar among blacks and whites, texts
are different).
225 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 238.
226 L. Levine, supra note 38, at 28 (quoting Mary Boykin Chesnut).
227 Id. at 29. For more such accounts, see id. at 27-28, 38.
228 Id. at 20-22.
229 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 250 (quoting J. Kennard); see also F. Boney, supra note
38, at 150 (describing influence of slave music and folklore upon white culture).
230 Raboteau, supra note 223, at 202.
231 Id. at 203.04. E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 260-61.
232 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 239.
233 Id. at 262-67.
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ical speech reflected more than a shared style-it reflected the com-
mon values of a culture that looked to oratory for demonstrations of
character. If slaves responded "more readily to evidence of spiritual
motivation in the preacher than they did to his argument, ' 234 the
political orator "could speak about any subject because each oration
placed on view 'the whole man' for all to see. "235 In a society ordered
by personalistic authority, such public demonstrations 'of estimable
character were "deeply cherished" by the assembled listeners. "What
mattered was the sense of community and reconfirmed loyalties that
such occasions aroused. ' 236 Black preachers helped provide Southern
statesmen with the means they used to demonstrate the honor and
reap the esteem they held so dear.
Wyatt-Brown has argued that Southern conceptions of honor
had ancient roots in the pre-Christian values of Celtic Europe.237 Yet
the extent of African contributions to the Southern cosmos is sug-
gested by the fact that they reached beyond the boundaries of Christi-
anity. Rural blacks and whites in the slave South evinced similar
magical beliefs. 238 Frightened or frustrated whites were not too proud
to seek the assistance of black conjurers. 239 And the irreverent carni-
vals that Wyatt-Brown found particularly expressive of timocratic
values in Southern culture also bore the stamp of African influence.24°
Southern religion-Christian and animist-inculcated the values of
honor, community, and responsibility among the masters, and yet
Southern religion was largely a product of the slaves.
We have seen that slaves shaped the values of the society that
esteemed the masters. But slaves may have played an even more di-
rect role in creating the vaunted gentility of the master class: many
Southern whites admired the demeanor and sought the esteem of the
slaves with whom they had such intimate contact.
The reader may well be forgiven for scoffing at the suggestion
that the affectations and refinements of the Southern aristocracy could
have sprung from an impoverished, uneducated, and illiterate people.
Yet this is the reality that she will have to accept. The supposedly
aristocratic slaveholders shared precisely these characteristics with
234 Id. at 243; see also Raboteau, supra note 223, at 203 (sermons display character).
235 K. Greenberg, supra note 142, at 13; see also B. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 135, at 330-31
(orations display character).
236 B. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 135, at 330-31.
237 Id. at 26-61.
238 L. Levine, supra note 38, at 59.
239 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 217-18.
240 B. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 135, at 444. There is of course a bitter irony here: the
lynchings and Klan rallies that came to symbolize Southern racism after the Civil War repre-
sent a less benign strand of this tradition. Id. at 435-61.
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their slaves. As W.J. Cash first acknowledged a half-century ago,
Southern notions of honor had little root in education, refinement, or
aristocratic heritage,24 1 and required no great intellectual accomplish-
ment to put into practice.242 Southern aristocrats were made, not
born-and not very well made at that.
Perhaps because of their humble origins and limited refinements,
Southern slaveholders often showed great status anxiety.243 How
could they reassure themselves that they were what they pretended to
be? No doubt they sought and got such reassurance from the less
wealthy whites. But to a surprising extent they were also psychologi-
cally invested in what their slaves thought of them. During the Civil
War, slaveholders insisted, in the teeth of their own misgivings, on the
contentment and loyalty of their slaves. 2 " When emancipation finally
came, "[e]x-slaveholders, on many pages of their diaries and letters,
betray[ed] hunger for recognition and the need to be needed again. '2 45
They evinced both bitterness and shock at the discovery of slave
"ingratitude. '246 One lamented that "'I can't get along without
you,'"247 while another complained that my "'heart is pained and
sickened with their vileness and falsehood in every way. I long to be
delivered from the race.' "248 Still others are reported to have at-
tempted suicide or "died of grief"' '249  "The slaves, by withholding
[gratitude], drove a dagger into their masters' self-image. ' 250 To a
great extent, white Southerners were psychologically dependent on
their slaves. After all, in the rough-hewn, uncultivated, and relatively
egalitarian society of nineteenth-century rural America, masters could
hardly remain aristocrats without them.
Yet slaves encouraged the South's aristocratic ethos by more ac-
tive means than simply occupying the lowest rung in a hierarchical
society. As between two uneducated rural populations, the slaves-
241 W. Cash, supra note 210, at 3-102. Cash's conclusions hold up well. See J. Oakes, supra
note 68, at 8 (Virginia slaveholding class emerged from indentured servitude); B. Wyatt-
Brown, supra note 135, at 65-66. The only real question is no longer whether many
Southerners possessed aristocratic refinements, but whether many of them even professed or
aspired to them. See F. Boney, supra note 38, at 14-15; J. Oakes, supra note 68, at 192-224.
242 B. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 135, at 92, 94, 97 -99 (anti-intellectualism of antebellum
.South). But cf. J. Oakes, supra note 68, at 57-59 (many large slaveholders were educated
professionals).
243 B. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 135, at 88-89.
244 L. Litwack, supra note 121, at 16, 61.
245 W. Rose, supra note 205, at 78.
246 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 97-112; W. Rose, supra note 205, at 86.
247 L. Litwack, supra note 121, at 188.
248 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 106 (quoting Mrs. Mary Jones).
249 Id. at 98; L. Litwack, supra note 121, at 193-94.
250 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 146.
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coming from a more traditional society-may have been more likely
than their masters to exemplify timocratic values. Certainly many
white observers were impressed by the demeanor of slaves and, in
later generations, black servants.
William Faulkner, who insisted that the slaves had always taken
aristocratic values more seriously than their masters,25 recalled his
own "Mammie" as "'brave, courageous, generous, gentle and honest
.. .much more brave and honest and generous than me.' "252 One
mistress describes her "mammy" as "'so superior, and as genuine a
'Lady' as I ever knew.' "253 A master recalled of his deceased black
slave that " 'no man white or black I have ever known was more ex-
emplary in his conduct. He was kind-moral-sober-industrious,
obedient-& honest-I never knew one who kept closer to the path of
rectitude.' "254 Another master was particularly struck by his chief
driver's bearing: " 'Intelligence and understanding showed in his face,
and force in his every movement. He looked indeed like one born to
command.' "255
As between Judge Seth Lewis and his manservant "Uncle Lea,"
Lewis's granddaughter thought " 'it was hard to say which had the
more personal dignity.' "256 Fanny Kemble praised her slaves'
"'courtesy and affable condescension,'" while her daughter thought
an educated but rude white man would do well to imitate their" 'gen-
tle and courteous ... manners.' "257 Frederick Law Olmsted, on visit-
ing Washington, found that " 'there were many more well-dressed
and highly dressed colored people than white . . . .Many of the
colored ladies['] . . .walk and carriage was more often stylish and
graceful than that of the white ladies who were out.' "258
Some slaves made an even deeper impression. Benjamin Ban-
neker, the black mathematician, impressed Jefferson as evidence of
the creator's egalitarianism; but Banneker's grandfather, an African
chief, impressed his owner more-she freed and married him.259 The
Thomas Fosters, Senior and Junior, were uncultivated nouveau riche
251 E. Genovese, supra note 158, at 6.
252 B. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 135, at 126 (quoting William Faulkner).
253 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 359 (quoting Eliza Frances Andrews).
254 Id. at 349 (quoting diary of Everard Green Baker, 1860).
255 Id. at 367 (quoting Duncan Clinch Heyward).
256 Id. at 352 (quoting A. Watts, A Summer on a Louisana Cotton Plantation in 1832, in
Pharr Book 96).
257 Id. at 116 (quoting Fanny Kemble, and her daughter); see also id. at 335 (Mary Boykin
Chestnut, remarking on good manners of slaves).
258 Id. at 329 (quoting Frederick Law Olmstead).
259 W. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812, at
449-54 (1968); Quarles, supra note 3, at 289.
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planters, lucky enough to have acquired as their chief driver the
Nigerian prince Abd-al Rashid Ibrahima, "whose sense of honor and
dignity far outdistanced that of his master and his master's sons.""26
To his father's everlasting shame, Thomas Junior abandoned his own
wife to keep company with the driver's daughter, who "shared her
father's arisocratic bearing.12 61 If the South's self-styled squires
showed surprising anxiety for the good opinion of their slaves, it was
because they often esteemed their slaves as discerning judges of
gentility.
Genovese argues that some slaves made effective use of their role
as exemplars of good manners and good taste. Some dignified retain-
ers found that their gracious deference gratified masters even more
than the sweat of their brow.262 Others raised their own status by
exalting that of their master relative to other whites. Genovese de-
scribes a house servant carrying a message to the master's lesser
neighbor. "Embarrassed, the neighbor pretended that he could not
read the planter's handwriting. The indignant servant insisted that
his master was too well educated to write poorly: 'You cannot read,
Sir!' "263
Some slaves used their role as guardian of their master's status to
assert authority over their masters as well. One slave named Emily
insisted that her mistress pack an evening dress when going to nurse
the confederate wounded: "'I ain't goin' to let my Mistis be outshined
by... dem other ladies.' "264 "Mammy Harriet" kept her charges out
of the kitchen by admonishing them to "'Sit in de parlor wid'er book
in y'or hand like little white ladies,' "and taxed them for making their
"'ma so mad, acting like sich po'r white trash.' ",265
Where they could, slaves deployed such influence over whites to
fashion them into the benevolent despots of legend. The culture, as
well as the interests of the slaves, dictated a preference that their mas-
ters exercise personal authority.266 By exalting and flattering their
masters, slaves endeavored to shame them into taking personal re-
sponsibility for conditions on the plantation. Especially during the
last thirty years of slavery, masters increasingly assumed that kind of
personal responsibility as "a duty and a burden" '267 and, with much
260 B. Wyatt-Brown, supra note 135, at 323.
261 Id. at 323.
262 E. Genovese, supra note 38, at 335 (comments of Mary Boykin Chestnut).
263 Id. at 113; see also id. at 330 (slaves exalting masters' status relative to other whites).
264 Id. at 346.
265 Id. at 354.
266 Id. at 118-20.
267 Id. at 49-70.
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self-pity and self-congratulation, erected identities on the sand of their
slaves' flattery.268
The Southern essayist James Dabbs sees the hand of the slave in
the timocratic culture of his own homeland to this day:
As for the manners [of the South], he helped to create them. It is
probable that he brought from the highly traditional life of Africa a
strong feeling for the importance of form .... It is true, [whites]
developed a racial etiquette to keep the Negro in his place. The
Negro, with his traditional feeling for manners, accepted this and
used it in part to keep the white man in his place; that is, to re-
strain the exploiter, to bring him under a degree of control. The
white tended to accept this control, even though he often realized it
was being imposed upon him.269
If the patient reader remains skeptical that slaves provided their mas-
ters with modes of gentility, community, and honor, she need only
reflect on the South as we have witnessed it in our lifetimes, the South
of the civil rights struggles. Which side in those struggles exhibited
the courtesy, dignity, courage, and refusal to brook insult that we as-
sociate with Southern gentry? Who, in those confrontations of bar-
baric violence with disciplined nonviolence, civilized whom? 270
Similarly, the slaves used paternalism, in part, to invest their
masters with some of the qualities that they valued themselves. The
slaves understood that they were deprived of freedom in Southern so-
ciety; but Southern society was partially of their own making and part
of the freedom prized by their masters was the freedom to develop
and express those traits of character esteemed by the slaves. Thus
freedom to the slaves as well as the masters meant taking responsibil-
ity for others and receiving in return the esteem of a community.
These values were distorted in the behavior of the masters and
purchased at the price of others' freedom and dignity-but they were
the values of the slaves, who understood that their freedom could
never be achieved by individual escape.
VIII. AN HEGELIAN APPROACH TO EMANCIPATION
The premise of this essay is that freedom can only be understood
as the negation of slavery-and that we see its attributes better in
societies that mark some of their members as slaves than in those that
congratulate themselves that their exploitation has taken some other
268 Id. at 75-86.
269 J. Dabbs, supra note 145, at 352.
270 See id. at 357-58 (nonviolent civil rights movement replicated traditional Southern phe-
nomenon of blacks teaching whites manners).
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form. Patterson's analysis of West African and other traditional slave
societies offers a critical perspective on the Western ideals of indepen-
dence and individualism that are expressed in market society. From
this perspective, the modern market ideal of being masterless or ut-
terly autonomous is social death. Paradoxically, it puts the modem
free laborer in a social position similar to that of the slave in tradi-
tional society. In some ways, the free laborer in a market society is
like the even more unfortunate African slaves displaced to America.
Not only are such laborers without a network of social protectors and
admirers, but they are without the social milieu-a community-in
which such a network would be possible and meaningful.
It is remarkable that Southern proslavery ideologues made simi-
lar critiques of free labor-critiques sufficiently trenchant that the
Marxist Genovese has analyzed them in loving detail, noting where
appropriate, their divergences from Marx's own critique.271 So that
where Patterson implies that the wage laborer in modern market soci-
ety-even if possessed of great wealth or status-is socially dead,
Genovese gleefully reminds us that Southern critics of Northern soci-
ety saw free laborers as "slaves without masters. "272
When Northern republicans looked at slavery they saw a society
that, in eschewing free labor, had turned its back on the ideal of inde-
pendence. In such a society, they reasoned, no one was truly free.
Accordingly, they equated emancipation with the atomization of soci-
ety. Yet when white Southerners looked at themselves, they had no
doubt that they were free, and the evidence was their political and
social authority within an organic community. And when their slaves
looked at themselves, they did not see laborers disabled from making
wage contracts. They saw men and women excluded not only from
authority, but even from membership in that organic community.273
More significantly, they saw a group of people prevented from estab-
271 See E. Genovese, supra note 158, at 118-93. Genovese rejects, but hardly refutes the
charge of using the "hero" of this work, George Fitzhugh, "as a pawn in a game of efiater les
bourgeois." Id. at 119; see also id. at 182-84 (relationship between Fitzhugh's work and
Marx's).
272 See id. at 179-84 (analyzing G. Fitzhugh, Cannibals All! or Slaves Without Masters
(1960)).
273 In the era of the civil rights movement, James Dabbs wrote:
[T]he Southern Negro wants more than justice .... He wants to belong com-
pletely to the community .... Always occupying an unjust and unhonored posi-
tion in the community, he has not yet been a part of it. He wishes now to be more
completely a part.... This mood can be seen in all the attempts of Negro demon-
strators to come to peaceful terms with the whites, to leave them a chance to save
face as they necessarily retreat, to improve the common community, not to destroy
it.
J. Dabbs, supra note 145, at 356.
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lishing and governing a community of their own. The freedom slav-
ery deprived them of was not the independence offered by Northern
free labor society.
What meaning can we give emancipation in light of this history?
It is here that Hegel's dialectical strategies provide useful models.
Hegel's dialectical logic models a world in which particulars cannot
exist independently of the whole. It is premised on the notion that
concepts cannot be maintained independently of one another or of
their historical context.274 Thus we cannot conceive of freedom ex-
cept in relation to some correlative conception of slavery; and we can-
not imagine emancipation without reference to a specific historical
experience with slavery. A further implication of the premise that
particulars cannot exist independently is to require us to place the
institution of slavery in the context of an entire society. Thus a dia-
lectical approach to emancipation emphasizes that negating slavery
would require changing the culture, and society that made slavery
both possible and meaningful. Yet the great appeal of the dialectical
approach is that it recognizes the complexity of this task. Emancipa-
tion is an example of what Hegel called "Aufhebung"-a negation
that also preserves.27 5 While we cannot root out slavery without up-
rooting its culture we can only give meaning to emancipation in a
culture that remembers slavery. Perhaps we can remember slavery
without condoning it, by identifying with the dream of human free-
dom envisioned by the slaves. That ideal can only be grasped by lis-
tening to the testimony of the slaves and of the masters as to what
slavery was-what it was and is in our history that we would negate,
but not forget; that we must transcend, but can never finally abolish.
IX. EMANCIPATING HEGEL
We have interpreted Hegel's dialectic of master and slave as a
critique of independence rather than an analysis of slavery. In using
Hegel's thought as a means to imagine an emancipatory future rather
than understand a slave past, we have taken liberties. Hegel, after all,
was a racist, as were most Western intellectuals of his time, believing
that Africans were "wild" and "sensual" cannibals, with no culture
and no history.2 76 From this "merely isolated sensual existence,"
slavery was, for Hegel, an
advance.., a phase of education-a mode of becoming participant
274 See C. Taylor, Hegel and Modem Society 45-46 (1979).
275 See, e.g., Phenomenology of Mind, supra note 1, at 222 (Aufhebung translated as
"sublation").
276 G. Hegel, The Philosophy of History 93-99 (J. Sibree trans. 1956).
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in a higher morality and.., culture .... Slavery is in and for itself
injustice, for the essence of humanity is Freedom; but for this man
must be matured. The gradual abolition of slavery is therefore
wiser and more equitable than its sudden removal.27 7
We might console ourselves that Hegel's racism had less influ-
ence than his abolitionism, but the quoted passages were in fact taken
seriously by Hegel's readers. At an 1890 conference on "The Negro
Question," William Torrey Harris, U.S. Commissioner of Education
and a leading American Hegelian, expressed concern that emancipa-
tion was leading to a " 'reversion to the former low state of spiritual
life.' "278 Another conference participant, using language reminiscent
of Hegel's own, described freedmen as "'the product of [their] sad
and dismal past' and as " 'wild, naked . . . man-eating savages'
with "'no history.' "279 At least some of Hegel's American followers
found his contempt for slaves more appealing than his condemnation
of slavery.
Others influenced by Hegel accepted his attack on slavery while
rejecting his racism. Marx, in a letter to Lincoln drafted on behalf of
the International Workingmen's Association, ridiculed the notion
that slavery was "a beneficent institution," and complained of the ra-
cial divisions slavery had imported among workers. The "white-
skinned laborer" would never achieve "true freedom," Marx com-
plained, by "boast[ing]" that he could "sell himself and choose his
own master" while blacks were "mastered and sold without [their]
concurrence."2 8' August Willich, the left-Hegelian who played a
leading role in introducing Marx's political economy in America, in-
sisted in 1860 that "[n]o man has a real right of possession either of
men or of the control of the state-men are born equal and remain
equal in rights."28
I think we, too, are authorized to use our judgment in determin-
ing which of Hegel's contradictions we valorize as "dialectical" and
which we dismiss as merely hypocritical. I believe that it is ultimately
more Hegelian to use him in discovering our own values, than to re-
main faithful to his.
The St. Louis movement, portrayed in The Rebel's Daughter,
turned to Hegel for help in interpreting the immense cultural conflict
277 Id. at 99 (emphasis in original).
278 H. Gutman, supra note 38, at 540 (quoting William T. Harris).
279 Id.
280 K. Marx & F. Engels, The Civil War in the United States 280 (1937); see also id. at 283
(Marx acknowledges authorship).
281 Willich,.A Republic of Labor and Intelligence, in The American Hegelians 182-83 (W.
Goetzmann ed. 1973).
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represented by the Civil War. Denton Snider, the Dr. Taylor of
Woerner's novel, commented:
A great world-historical deed had been done with enormous labor
and outer panoramic pageantry. What lay in it for us and for the
future? So we began to grope after the ... pure Essences ... as
they are called by our philosophic authority. These transcendent
energies of man and of the world were said to be collected and
ordered in one book-Hegel's Logic.2"2
It is with an awareness that Hegel's thought was the true constitution
of this peculiar community that we should read the constitutional
views expressed by the odious Professor Rauhenfels in Woerner's
novel. Arguing against the constitutionality of abolition, Rauhenfels
bids us
Be warned by the fate of Antigone: She obeyed what she felt to be
the law written in her breast by the gods themselves in preference
to the king's decree, and perished, because Institutions are valid,
though individuals deem them cruel or absurd. So shall they per-
ish, who lay sacrilegious hands on the constitution ... !..
Yet, as Professor Thomas teaches us, the lesson Hegel himself
draws from "the fate of Antigone" bodes ill for Professor
Rauhenfels's rigid constitution: "[T]he public spirit... learns that its
supreme right is supreme wrong, its victory rather its own defeat.
The slain, whose right is injured, knows, therefore, how to find means
of vengeance which are equally as real and strong as the power at
whose hands it has suffered." '284 Much to be preferred, and truer to
the spirit of Hegel, are the constitutional views expressed by the char-
acter of the Dominie in an earlier dialogue from The Rebel's
Daughter:
"[A]n individual cannot be permitted to set up his own opinion as
the standard of right and wrong," [said the colonel] .... [T]he
constitution is good enough for me, and... I do not propose to sit
in judgment on its morality."
"That is a thing that you cannot help doing, sir," said the
Dominie amid the breathless attention of the others.... The hum-
blest citizen does this every time he performs his duty at the polls:
how much more yourself, who are called on, as an illustrious
statesman, to guide the ship of State. You certainly know it to be
your duty to actively assist in amending the constitution so as to
282 Snider, Starting from St. Louis, in The American Hegelians, supra note 281, at 31.
283 J. Woerner, supra note 42, at 429-30.
284 Phenomenology of Mind, supra note 1, at 495; see Thomas, A House Divided Against
Itself: A Comment on "Mastery, Slavery, and Emancipation," 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1481
(1989).
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purify it from any defect that has become apparent to you. Is not
that a judgment against its adequacy? Or you may oppose any
suggested amendment, or simply remain inactive. Is not that a
judgment in its favor? In this way every human being that owes
allegiance to our government continually passes judgement on the
sufficiency of the constitution."
"And in doing so," Dr. Taylor interjected, "they have no
higher criterion than their conscience.
28 5
The Dominie goes on to argue that no constitution is an exhaus-
tive expression of the will of the people whose sovereignty it embod-
ies, and so every constitution requires perpetual amendment. 8 6 So we
scholars of Hegelian legal theory may also count ourselves a political
community, and Hegel's thought our constitution. We are duty-
bound to interpret and even to amend it to conform to our collective
conscience and the needs of our time. We show truer allegiance to the
Hegelian project by thus perpetuating its meaningfulness than by pi-
ously preserving its original meaning for a society whose crimes we
have yet to overcome.
If learning from history requires that we invoke worthy ances-
tors, it also requires that we invent them. So too, in learning what
Hegel has to teach about human liberation, it has been necessary for
us, in part, to invent him-to detach him from his own past and apply
him to our future. Had we been truer to Hegel, we would have been
less good to him-and he little good to us.
285 J. Woerner, supra note 42, at 424-26.
286 Id.
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